CONFIDENTIALITY: A MEASURED RESPONSE TO THE
FAILURE OF PRIVACY
G. MICHAEL HARVEYt
INTRODUCTION

In the course of a lifetime, an individual necessarily shares with
others information that she would like to keep private. To name
only a few such situations, an individual may discuss her sexual
orientation or proclivities with a potential lover, seek advice from
a friend concerning an abortion, or request a loan from a parent for
psychotherapy. Similarly, an individual may engage in activities
which she would like to keep private, but that require the presence
of another person, such as consenting to a doctor disconnecting her
irreversibly brain-damaged parent or child from life-support
machines, or having an extramarital affair. In addition, sometimes
individuals may find it necessary to reveal personal information to
institutions. This information is thereafter memorialized in files or
databases ranging from police reports indicating that the individual
has been raped, to medical records reflecting her cosmetic surgery,
to lists showing that she was a member of an AIDS patient therapy
group.
The importance of sharing such information with others cannot
be doubted. Sometimes the confider of the information has no
choice in the matter. A rape victim, for example, has to give her
name to the police. Similarly, it is difficult to keep your identity
secret from a lover. In many other situations where the confider
can choose not to divulge the information, it is important that she
does share it. Discussing our fears, problems, and ideas with others
is crucial for informed decision-making and self-discovery.
When an individual has disclosed such personal information to
persons or institutions, she relies upon notions of trust and civility
in social relations to ensure that it is not publicized. Unfortunately,
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reliance on the goodwill of intimates and strangers may not be
sufficient; confidants, whether they be friends or employees of
institutions who have access to personal information, may give or
sell the personal information to publications i or prove so negligent
in their protection of the information that the media has easy access
to it.

2

In general, the more unusual or intimate the information, or the
more prominent its subject, the more likely it is that the media will
desire to publish it.3 For example, the private lives of political
figures have increasingly been the targets of media scrutiny.4 The
1 See Steven I. Katz, Comment, Unauthorized Biographies and Other "Books of
Revelations': A Celebrity's Legal Recourse to A Truthful PublicDisclosure, 36 UCLA L.
REV. 815,819 (1989) (asserting in the narrower context of public figures that reasons
for revealing embarrassing confidences "range from the obvious commercial benefits
of publishing the secrets of a celebrity's life, to a desire to offer a 'valentine' to a
former employer, to an emotional need to 'tell the whole world what a bastard' the
subject of the disclosure is") (footnotes omitted).
2 See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 538 (1989) (involving a rape victim
whose identity was released to the press through the "inadvertent... inclusion by the
[Police] Department of her full name in an incident report made available in a
pressroom open to the public"); Karen Timmons, Study Finds CreditReport Errors,L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 1991, Valley Edition, at 9F (reporting on Consumers' Union study
that found that 27% of the 400 million credit reports now on file for nearly 90% of
Americans "'indicated that third parties had gotten access to their reports without
their permission'"). One researcher of medical privacy claims that his
rule of thumb is that anything you tell anybody in a hospital is available to
anybody who is interested enough to go and get it ....
Previously your
privacy was protected by the fact that your records ... were unreadable,
they were disorganized and they were hidden away somewhere in the
basement.... Now it's a piece of cake.... The patients become a data
base.
Karen Timmons, When it Comes to Medical Privacy, Your File Could be an Open Book,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1990, at A35, A38 (quoting Vincent Brannigan). The Washington
Post detailed an FBI investigation of a national network of "information brokers...
[who] were bribing.., government employees to run computer checks on individuals
for as little as $50 a pop. Computer checks were being run 'on thousands of
people.'" Michael Isikoff, Theft of U.S. Data Seen as Growing Threat to Privacy, WASH.
PoST, Dec. 28, 1991, at Al, A4. The article concluded that "'insider' information
trading may be far more widespread than previously suspected. For the past several
years, while the news media have focused on the threat posed by outside computer
hackers, law enforcement officials have been making a growing number of cases
against computer 'insiders' who sell data to ['outsiders']." Id.
3 See Katz, supra note 1, at 819 & n.19 (asserting that "intimate disclosures sell"
and substantiating the claim that "'tell-all' unauthorized biographies have traditionally
fared very well financially").
4 See David Lamb, Into the Realm of Tabloids, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1992, at Al, A17
("What has happened.., is that ratings and circulation-read that money-power the
engine [of the media] and that politicians have become celebrities, making Hollywood
and Washington, D.C., much closer in spirit than most people on Capitol Hill feel
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alleged affair between Gennifer Flowers and Democratic presidential candidate Bill Clinton 5 is just the latest and most dramatic
illustration of a phenomenon that has been termed the "smoking
bimbo," 6 that is, the media exposure of a politician's extramarital
lovers. 7 Non-political celebrities are also exposed to intensive
comfortable admitting."). Another commentator states:
A case can be made that with respect to presidential candidates or
Presidents, the broader concern we have for "character" makes patterns of
personal behavior relevant.
But far more often than not these days, the link that is made between
private behavior and public performance is a tenuous one, used simply as
an excuse to report rumors and salacious details, or no link is made at all,
and we are left with what amounts to commercially driven invasions of
privacy.
NormanJ. Ornstein, Sexpress, ATLANTIC, Oct. 1991, at 24, 26.
5 Gennifer Flowers divulged in Star(a supermarket tabloid with a circulation of
3.5 million), that she had had a twelve-year extramarital affair with Bill Clinton, who
was at that time the front-runner in the New Hampshire Democratic presidential
primary. See Marion Collins, My 12-year Affair with Bill Clinton, STAR, Feb. 4, 1992,
at 24; see also Bill Turque et al., Northern Exposure, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 17, 1992 at 20, 29
(discussing the compromising of Bill Clinton's electibility in light of tabloid
allegations of his infidelity). It was believed that Flowers received somewhere
between $130,000 and $175,000 for her story. See William A. Henry III, Handlingthe
Clinton Affair, TIME, Feb. 10, 1992, at 28 (stating that Flowers' fee was "amply
recouped [by Star] via an estimated $800,000 that her well-hyped recollections earned
at newsstands"). Following the success of Star's exclusive, "the cash-for-trash patrol
went wild, with some tabloid reporters offering up to a half a million dollars to
anyone with a story to tell." Eleanor Clift et al., CharacterQuestions,NEWSWEEK, Feb.
10, 1992, at 26, 27.
The Clinton campaign was also plagued by a leak to ABC News of a 1969 letter
in which then-Oxford student Clinton told a University of Arkansas ROTC Colonel
that the Vietnam War was "illegitimate" and thanked the Colonel for "saving me from
the draft." See Clinton: Questions over Source of Leaked '69 Letter, THE HOTLINE, Feb.
13, 1992, White House '92 section, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Hotline file.
Clinton responded:
[ABC News anchorperson Ted] Koppel confirmed to me that it is his
understanding that ABC received a letter from two different sources, both
of whom got it from the Pentagon.... This kind of activity... leaking
papers-is exactly what was wrong with this country twenty years ago. It
represents a pattern of behavior by people desperate to stay in power, and
willing to impugn the motives, the patriotism, and the lives of anyone who
stands in their way. We've been down the road of dirty tricks before....
[President] Bush and the (GOP) will do anything it takes to win. That's
what they did in 1988, and they'll do it again in 1992.
Id. Clinton finished second in the New Hampshire primary, eight percentage points
behind the leader.
6 See Helen Fielding & Geordie Greig, The Smoking Bimbo, SUNDAY TIMES, Feb. 2,
1992, § 4, at 1.
7 Other recent examples of this phenomenon include the alleged affairs between
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media scrutiny. Whether it is information concerning sexual
orientation, proclivities, or failing health, personal facts about
celebrities sells magazines 8 and drives the editorial judgments of a
growing portion of the media. 9 Tantalizing us with an "insider's"
look at the personal preferences and kinky lifestyles of public
figures are: "Oprah," "Geraldo," "Donahue," "Hard Copy," "A
Current Affair," and "Entertainment Tonight" on television; People,
Vanity Fair, Star, and the Enquirer on the newsstands; and Kitty

Kelley in the bookstores. 10 The privacy of private individuals is
also not shielded from the press. Unusual facts about private
individuals-whether it be a rare health defect, a twelve-year old
mother, or the identity of a rape victim-can also attract the media
1
spotlight. '
Although the age of "infotainment"12 is obviously fueled by a
measure of self-promotion on the part of personalities1 3 and
Virginia Senator Chuck Robb and Tai Collins in 1991, and between Democratic
presidential candidate Gary Hart and Donna Rice in 1988. Falling in what could be

called the "smoking gigolo" category, would be the affair between Nancy Reagan and
Frank Sinatra alleged by Kitty Kelley in her unauthorized biography of the First Lady.
See KITTY KELLEY, NANCY REAGAN: THE UNAUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY 311-12 (1991).
8 As People magazine's managing editor, Landon Jones, put it:
[W]e've tapped into a universal interest-that people are interested in
people.... It's so basic and fundamental that the appetite for it is
enormous. I don't want to put down my sister publication, Time, at all.
But suffice it to say that I think there are probably more people interested
in personalities than in issues.
Lamb, supra note 4, at A16 (quoting LandonJones).
9 See id. ("Pick up Vanity Fair,Esquireor a woman's magazine today: The face of
a marketable celebrity on the cover is evidence of People's success. (People'sRichard
Dreyfuss cover bombed in street sales while Michael Landon was a blockbuster)."); see
also Pat H. Broeske & John M. Wilson, Outing Target Hollywood, L.A. TIMES, July 22,
1990, Calendar sec., at 6 (reporting that "outing'-revealing the homosexuality of
celebrities and public figures-has shifted from the tabloids into the mainstream
press).
10 While details of personalities' sexual proclivities have been available to the
public in some form since the 1950's, see Irwin 0. Spiegel, PublicCelebrity v. Scandal
Magazine-The Celebrity's Right to Privacy, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 280, 281-86 (1957),
"tabloid journalism" seems to be on the rise. In 1991, People magazine passed Time
as the nation's top advertising revenue producing magazine. See Lamb, supra note 4,
at Al. People, with a circulation of 3.1 million and 28 million readers, is said to be
the most profitable magazine in the world. See id.
11 See, e.g., Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524,527 (1989) (newspaper reveals name
of rape victim); Meetze v. Associated Press, 95 S.E.2d 606,609 (S.C. 1956) (newspaper
exposes 12-year-old mother).
12 See Lamb, supra note 4, at A16 (attributing the term to ABC's "Nightline"
correspondent Jeff Greenfield).
13 Although readers may believe third-parties are providing the information, not
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exhibitionism on the part of private individuals, 14 it has also had
its unwilling victims. The subjects of these often merciless press
"feeding frenzies" have suffered embarrassment and humiliation as
their private lives are exposed to the public, 15 and the very process
of political and social debate has been degraded. i The response
of the legal system to this problem has largely been one of acquiescence. In the interest of upholding the First Amendment's
guarantee of freedom of the press, 17 courts have extended to both
public and private figures very limited protection from the media.
The subjects of media exposes usually have only the "disclosure of
private facts" branch of the "invasion of privacy" tort1 8 as a legal
uncommonly
celebrities themselves are sources for stories intended to advance their
careers or their projects .... "Stars rarely admit it in public," said Enquirer
articles editor Dianne Albright, "but in private they'll tell you: 'When I stop
appearing in the National Enquirer I know my career is on the skids.' And
when they start to slide, they'll pick up the phone and call us with a story
idea."
Id. at A17.

14 See Alex S. Jones, News Media Torn Two Ways in Debate on Privacy,N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 1992, at B15 (noting that the current debate on privacy is "taking place in
an era of staggering exhibitionism, when individuals compete to reveal the most
intimate and embarrassing aspects of their lives before an audience of millions on
television
shows like 'Oprah' and 'Sally Jessy Raphael.'").
15
SeeJan Gehorsam, Newspaper Criticizedfor TriggeringAshe'sRevelation, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., Apr. 9, 1992, at A6 (commenting on the "ugly hysteria" that surrounded
tennis star Arthur Ashe's "forced" public confession that he had the AIDS virus).
16 After the Clinton-Flowers disclosures, one disillusioned commentator lamented
that
our current presidential selection process has been highjacked and distorted
by a press run amok, losing all sense ofjudgement and perspective. The
press-not the candidates, the parties, or the public-has set the agenda for
our choice among presidential candidates as one that's focused not on
prospects for governance, leadership, or issue direction, but on scandal or
allegations of scandal, not just today but a quarter century ago or more.
Norman J. Ornstein, Press Hijacking. Distorting The Way We Select Presidents,ROLL
CALL, Feb. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis, ROLLCL file.
17 The First Amendment reads, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18 In mostjurisdictions, the invasion of privacy cause of action is divided into four

separate torts: 1) unreasonable intrusion into the plaintiff's seclusion; 2) commercial
appropriation of the plaintiff's name or likeness; 3) disclosure placing the plaintiff in
a false light; and 4) disclosure of the plaintiff's private life. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). This Comment will only be concerned with the

fourth branch of the invasion of privacy cause of action, the "public disclosure of
private facts" tort.
In the interest of brevity, the "public disclosure of private facts" tort will be
referred to as the "private-facts tort," and plaintiffs who bring private-facts tort claims
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remedy for the publication of truthful information.19 The Restatement (Second) of Torts formulates this cause of action as publicity

given to private facts that "would be highly offensive to a reasonable
20
person" and that are "not of legitimate concern to the public."
In practice courts have rarely found the publication of personal
information concerning private figures to be "offensive" because
they fear chilling freedom of the press. 21 Public-figure plaintiffs
have fared even more poorly in private-facts litigation because most
courts believe that they have waived any right to privacy in the
process of becoming celebrated personalities. Any public disclosure
of facts concerning them is held to be of public concern and
therefore nonactionable. 22 The lack of a judicial remedy has been
a rude awakening for private individuals, 23 and has left public
figures despondent.

24

This Comment will argue that judicial reluctance to enforce the
private-facts tort can be attributed to an inherent flaw in the private-

facts tort itself, not in the interests it is trying to protect. By
focusing liability on the point of publication 25 -that is, on the
media organizations who publicize the personal information-the
tort was doomed from the start. The belief in a free and inquisitive
press runs deep in this country. Though there has been a public
will be referred to as "private-facts plaintiffs."
19 The private-facts cause of action for the publication of truthful, albeit private,
information should be distinguished from the defamation tort. Defamatory speech
is false speech that injures the plaintiff's reputation or lowers the community's
estimation of the individual. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 773-74 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
This Comment will only be concerned with private-facts torts and the disclosure of
truthful information.
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 18, § 652D(a)-(b).
21 See infra notes 125-137 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 140-142 and accompanying text.
2 In one particularly poignant case, Justice White wrote in dissent:
As a result [of a newspaper article identifying the plaintiff by name as a rape
victim, the plaintiff] received harassing phone calls, required mental health
counseling, was forced to move from her home, and was even threatened
with being raped again. Yet today, the Court holds that a jury award of
$75,000 to compensate [her] for the harm she suffered due to the
[newspaper's publication of her name] is at odds with the First Amendment.
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 542-43 (1989) (White, J., dissenting).
24 See Katz, supra note 1, at 820 ("[T]he wide latitude generally granted to the
media when the focus of the presentation is a public figure, in tandem with the very
low recovery rate against the media under other circumstances, have persuaded
celebrities to resign themselves to privacy-invading publicity exposing intimate facets
of their personal lives.") (footnote omitted).
25 See infra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
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outcry with each new media advance into the realm of the personal,2 6 sanctioning newspapers for publishing truthful information
and permitting juries to decide what is and is not newsworthy
27
profoundly disturbs journalists, judges, and citizens alike.
Unfortunately, the ramifications of such reverence for the First
Amendment are no less disconcerting: individuals whose privacy
has been invaded by public disclosure of personal information have
no viable legal remedy in American jurisprudence.
Lovers of privacy should not concede defeat at this juncture,
however. For the law has thus far overlooked the other party who
is essential to the public disclosure of personal information but for
whom constitutional protection is tenuous in comparison to that of
publishers2 -that is, the source of the information.2 9 Sources
are key players in the disclosure of personal information: "[t]o meet
society's appetite for celebrity revelations, ...

[a tabloid has] a

network of several thousand tipsters worldwide-journalists,
hairdressers, cameramen, limo drivers, producers, sometimes even
stars.... Someone-for either the thrill of the chase or the pleasure

of dollars-is always willing to tell." 30 In all the examples discussed
26

Se4 e.g., Douglas Todd, Extra! Extra! It's Extramarital!,THE VANCOUVER SUN,

Feb. 15, 1992, at D15 ("The supermarket tabloid that paid to have Flowers claim a
torrid 12-year affair with ... Bill Clinton acted as outrageously unethically as a
newspaper can, even for a rag that regularly reports on Elvis sightings and humans
mating with inter-galactic aliens."). A Time magazine poll following the ClintonFlowers ordeal revealed that most Americans think journalists should stay out of
political candidates' personal lives. See Henry, supranote 5, at 28. According to 69%
of the 1000 adults surveyed, information about private behavior, including
extramarital affairs, should be kept from voters out of respect for the candidates'
privacy, even if there is hard proof of the information's truth; only 25% said that such
information should be revealed. See id. In addition, 82% thought the press pays too
much attention to personal lives in general; only 3% said too little. See id. Nearly half
blamed media discussion of personal lives for crowding out discussion of political
issues. See id.
27 See infra notes 112-117 and accompanying text.
28 See Mortimer B. Zuckerman, MoneyforMischief,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb.
10, 1992, at 82 (concluding that Gennifer Flowers "is not a victim... [because she]
and her patrons have victimized the press, the public and Bill Clinton").
29 It is assumed here that the information was disclosed to the media through a
source other than the individual herself.
30 Lamb, supra note 4, at A17; see also Broeske & Wilson, supra note 9, at 6
(stating that a weekly column in Outweek magazine would reveal the homosexuality of
a celebrity if it was corroborated by "'at least two independent sources that had [a
sexual] experience with the person'") (quoting Michelangelo Signorile, features editor
of Outweek magazine);Jones, supra note 14, at B19 (stating that editors of USA Today
would not report that a prominent, retired sports celebrity had AIDS "without on-therecord sources").
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above, there was a disclosure of information between the individual
and an intimate prior to publicity. The existence of this as yet
ignored link in the chain of public disclosure of personal information opens up the possibility of attaching liability at the source of
the information leak under a breach of confidence theory.3 1 In
order to preserve the privacy interests left unprotected by the
impotent private-facts tort, this Comment advocates interring the
private-facts tort and adopting a new approach to overcoming the
tension between privacy interests and the First Amendment: a
legally enforceable duty of confidentiality that attaches whenever a
person or institution intentionally or negligently engages in an
unauthorized disclosure of inaccessible, personal information that
she/it has explicitly and voluntarily agreed to hold in confidence,
2
and this disclosure results in the publicity of that information.3
Though England has recognized a similar breach of confidence
4
doctrine3 3 as the basis of privacy protection in that country,3
American courts and commentators have rejected such an approach
primarily because it would be redundant with the invasion of privacy
tort,3 5 it would present a myriad of practical3 6 and constitutional
s1 In an attempt to avoid conflicts between the rights of the press and the rights
of individuals victimized by public disclosure of private facts, Congress and some state
legislatures have moved to control leaks at their source. See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1905
(1989) (prohibiting knowing disclosure by federal employees of confidential
information obtained in the course of their employment). In New York, sex-offense
records naming victims must be kept confidential by public officers or employees.
See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTs LAW § 50-b (Consol. Supp. 1991). This confidentiality statute
was amended in 1991 to permit the victim to bring a civil action against public
officials who leak the victim's name. See id. § 50-c.
32 This formulation of a breach of confidence tort will be referred to in this
Comment as the "breach of confidence tort." The information-giver in the
confidential relationship will be referred to as the "confider"; the information-receiver
will be referred to as the "confidant."
s3 See Coco v. A.N. Clark (Engineers) Ltd., 1969 R.P.D. & T.M. 41, 47-48 (Eng.)
(delineating the elements of a legally enforceable confidence in England as follows:
a confider must establish 1) that confidential information existed, 2) that it was
disclosed in circumstances which imposed an obligation on the confidant to respect
its confidentiality, and 3) that the confidant breached this obligation).
34 See FRANCIS GURRY, BREACH OF CONFIDENCE 13 (1984) (stating that the English

common law duty of confidentiality provides a "limited right to prevent violations of
one's state of privacy").
3
5 See Alan B. Vickery, Comment, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 1426,1460-61 (1982) ("The law of confidence should not intrude into
the realm of family and personal relationships, even though damaging information
is often revealed in the course of such relationships.... Privacy law with its 'highly
offensive' threshold provides ample protection for personal relations.") (footnotes
omitted).
36 See Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
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difficulties,3 7 and it would be under-protective of privacy interests.3 8 This Comment will demonstrate that an enforceable duty
of confidentiality can overcome all of these objections and provide
a better balance of privacy and First Amendment interests than the
existent private-facts tort.
While a full delineation of the scope and exceptions of the
proposed tort must wait until Part HI of this Comment, its critical
aspects deserve note at this point so as to immediately alleviate the
most pressing concerns raised by the breach of confidentiality
concept. First, although the proposed tort establishes as a constitutional minimum that an "explicit" and "voluntary" "agreement" of
confidentiality must exist between the parties, an oral agreement
39
would be sufficient.
Second, the proposed tort is not intended to overly constrict the
natural human propensity to gossip. Rather, its goal is to provide
a remedy if there is a public disclosure of confidential information
on a widespread basis. The "publicity" requirement will be the pivot
on which the tension between these interests will be accommodated.4 0
Third, the "personal" information requirement of the proposed
tort would prevent it from being used by the government or other
41
institutional bodies to strangle "whistleblowers."
Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291,337 (1983) ("Judges either tacitly or
expressly recognize that they would create an impossible legal tangle if they subjected
back-fence and front-parlor gossip to liability.") (footnote omitted); Katz, supra note
1, at 816 ("A breach of confidence may take many forms, only some of which are
legally actionable.... [G]ossip in its simplest form, between individuals, cannot
practically speaking be the basis of a cause of action by the person whose activities
are the subject of the conversation.").
37 See Vickery, supra note 35, at 1458 ("Attaching a legal duty to every confidence
received with knowledge of its confidential nature demands too much.... It would
not be consistent with the notion of a free society for the state to intrude so deeply
into individual decisionmaking with respect to one's casual relationships absent a
compelling reason .... "). The proposed tort avoids rendering ordinary gossip
actionable by recognizing only those breaches of confidence that lead to "publicity."
See supra text accompanying note 32; infra notes 258-269 and accompanying text.
38 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L.
REV. 193, 210-11 (1890) (rejecting the "narrower doctrine" of breach of confidence
based on violation of a contract because "modern devices afford abundant
opportunities for the perpetration of such wrongs without any participation by the
injured party").
" Although the proposed tort recognizes both oral and written agreements, a
written agreement would improve the confider's evidentiary position in the event of
a suit.
4 0 See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 258-269 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 241-244 and accompanying text.
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Fourth, the tort would provide exemptions to the obligation of
confidentiality if the confider's revelations concerned activities
dangerous to the public health or safety or amounting to fraud or
42
criminal conduct.
Fifth, the proposed breach of confidence tort would not be
offensive to the confidant's First Amendment rights because she will
have explicitly waived her right to disseminate the confidential
information to the public through her agreement of confidentiality
with the confider, and because the information bound by the
obligation of confidentiality will necessarily be limited and clearly
defined.45
Sixth, the proposed breach of confidence tort would safeguard
freedom of the press by focusing liability on the "sources" or
"leakers" of information rather than on the point of publication,
thereby permitting members of the media to print with impunity
any information that they have lawfully obtained. 44 Because the
scope of information that can be protected by a duty of confidentito
ality is narrow and well-delineated,45 the press would continue
46
have access to a wide range of information and sources.
Seventh, while this Comment will substantiate the claim that a
right to confidentiality is a narrower protection of privacy interests
than a general right to privacy,47 that narrowness is its strength.
Because of its greater precision, the proposed tort avoids the
practical and constitutional problems that have made courts
reluctant to give any substance to the private-facts tort. It thus
provides greater protection to privacy interests simply by virtue of
being more likely to be enforced by the courts.
Finally, it should be noted that the proposed tort is a radically
different approach to privacy protection than the private-facts tort
in that it requires the potential confider to take affirmative steps
42

See infra notes 283-294 and accompanying text.

43 For an exploration of the interface between the proposed tort and the

confidant's First Amendment rights, see infra notes 298-348 and accompanying text.
4 The proposed breach of confidence tort will thereby shield the press from
liability for failure to distinguish "newsworthy" information from that "too offensive"
for publication-a Sisyphean determination imposed by the current private-facts tort.
The "newsworthiness" requirement's potential for chilling freedom of the press has
been a primary reason for the current tort's demise. See infra notes 125-131 and
accompanying text.
45 For a delineation of the scope of the breach of confidence tort, see infra notes
204-240
and accompanying text.
46
See infra notes 378-384 and accompanying text.
47 See infra notes 223-226 and accompanying text.
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(that is, to obtain an agreement of confidentiality from the
confidant) in order for the obligation of confidentiality to attach.
Therefore this tort would demand that individuals change the way
in which they approach their own privacy protection. Instead of
relying on members of the press to protect their privacy interests,
individuals themselves would bear the burden of delineating what
48
is and is not private.
The rest of this Comment will develop the above arguments.
Part I will demonstrate that liability for breach of confidence has a
basis in both British and American common law. Part II will chart
the death of the private-facts tort and show that the tort's demise is
due to the constitutional and definitional problems it presents, not
to a deficiency in the privacy interests it was created to protect.
Part III will formally introduce the proposed breach of confidence
tort, defining its elements, scope, and exceptions. That section will
also demonstrate how the tort effectively overcomes the definitional
problems that eroded the effectiveness of the private-facts tort. Part
IV will show that a breach of confidence cause of action, when
properly construed, does not infringe upon freedom of the press or
speech. The Comment concludes by suggesting that a breach of
confidence cause of action would come as a welcomed measure of
relief in a legal system where the First Amendment has rendered the
protection provided by the more broad-based private-facts tort
unattainable.
I. BREACH OF CONFIDENCE IN ENGLISH AND
AMERICAN COMMON LAW

When one person shares information with another, and the
confidant agrees not to divulge this information to third parties, an
expectation of confidentiality arises. If this confidence is broken,
the extent to which resulting harm can be legally redressed differs
in English and American common law. In England, the action for
breach of confidence is well-developed; 49 in the United States,
48 Therefore, the observation that the proposed tort would have little application

to current social interactions because explicit agreements of confidentiality are not
usually exchanged before personal information is disclosed, though correct, misses
the point. It is the author's belief that, if the proposed tort were adopted, individuals
would begin to make such agreements in order to protect personal information they
do not wish to have publicized. See infra note 215.
49 For the elements of the English breach of confidence cause of action, see supra
note 33.
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however, the right to sue for broken confidences has been overshadowed by the private-facts tort. With the decline of the private-facts
tort in the latter half of this century, however, the breach of
confidence tort has experienced a recent reemergence in American
common law.
This section will briefly explore the historical
precedent of the breach of confidence tort in British and American
common law.
English jurisprudence, while never recognizing a general cause
of action for invasion of privacy, has developed an extensive body
of law delineating actionable breaches of confidence. 50 English
courts first recognized breach of confidence as a cause of action in
Prince Albert v. Strange,51 in which the court held that a printer's
unauthorized distribution of a surreptitiously made catalogue of
royal etchings entrusted to him by Prince Albert was "a breach of
trust, confidence, or contract." 52
Since Prince Albert, English
courts have expanded the action to protect information as diverse
54
53
commercial and technical secrets,
as marital communications,
and government communications; 55 and to encompass relationships as diverse as banker-customer, 56 attorney-client, 5 7 Cabinet
60
5 9
58
photographer-subject,
accountant-client,
Minister-Cabinet,
and husband-wife.6 1 While some British commentators have called
for the recognition of a general right to privacy in English common
law, 62 in 1981 the British Law Commission, an advisory body to

50 See COMMITrEE ON PRIVACY, REPORT 9-12 (1972) (Eng.) (government committee
report acknowledging that British common law does not recognize a general right to
privacy and recommending an expansion of the breach of confidence doctrine to
cover certain specific invasions of privacy).
51 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (Ch. 1849).
52 Id. at 1179.
53 See Duchess of Argyll v. Duke of Argyll, [1965] 2 W.L.R. 789 (Eng. Ch. 1964).
54 See Saltman Eng'g Co. v. Campbell Eng'g Co., 65 R.P.D. & T.M. 203 (Eng. C.A.
1948).
5 See Attorney-General v. Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1976 Q.B. 752 (Eng. 1975).
56 See Tournier v. National & Provincial Union Bank of Eng., [1924] 1 K.B. 461
(En. C.A. 1923).
i See Taylor v. Blacklow, 132 Eng. Rep. 401 (C.P. 1836).
58 See Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1976 Q.B. at 771.
59 See Weld-Blundell v. Stephens, [1919] 1 K.B. 520 (Eng. C.A.).
60 See Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch. D. 345 (Eng. 1888).
61 See Duchess of Argyll v. Duke of Argyll, [1965] 2 W.L.R. 789 (Eng. Ch. 1964).
62 For example:

For many years, various commentators have advocated that there should be
a right of privacy: that people should be able to conduct their lives free
from intrusive journalistic surveillance. With the increased availability of
mechanical aids to facilitate observation, this argument has become
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Parliament, instead recommended that the common law action for
breach of confidence be reformulated into a statutory tort providing
a single set of principles for all kinds of confidences. 63 Breach of
confidence continues today as the chosen method of privacy
64
protection in English common law.
The use of the breach of confidence cause of action to protect
personal privacy 65 in American common law has taken a more
circuitous route. One of the earliest American breach of confidence
cases, decided in 1894, was Corliss v. E.W. Walker C0. 6 6 In that
case, a Massachusetts court concluded that it was a "violation of
confidence" for a photographer to make additional copies of a
picture of a deceased inventor. 67 In contrast to England's experience, however, there was no explosive growth of the breach of
stronger. Although the law of confidence can prevent some of the worst
excesses, alone it is insufficient. English law has reached a state where it
could develop without undue difficulty to recognise an enforceable right of
privacy. It is hoped that the law will do this ....
M.P. Thompson, Breach of Confidence and the Protectionof Privacy in English Law, 6J.
MEDIA L. & PRAC. 5, 22 (1985) (footnote omitted).
6
3 See THE LAW COMMISSION, LAW COM. No. 110, BREACH OF CONFIDENCE [ 6.1-.5
(1981) [hereinafter LAW COMMISSION REPORT]. The Law Commission's recommendation for a statutory tort has not yet been followed by Parliament. The common law
cause of action continues to be enforced by the courts, however.
64 SeeJ. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 572 (7th ed. 1987).
65 This Comment is concerned with the use of the breach of confidence tort to
protect personal confidences as opposed to business or industry secrets. See infra
notes 241-244 and accompanying text. It should be noted, however, that breach of
confidence is a central element in the protection of unpublished literary works in
common law copyright law. See e.g., Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 112 (Mass. 1912)
(stating that copyright protection of unpublished letters would exist where "a
confidential relation exist[s] between the parties, out ofwhich would arise an implied
prohibition against any use of the letters, and a breach of such trust might be
restrained in equity"); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 16.06, at 16-48 (1992) ("An idea offered and received in confidence if
later disclosed by the idea recipient will give rise to a breach of confidence action.")
(footnote omitted). In the protection of trade secrets area, see, e.g., ROGER M.
MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 4.01-.03 (1991) (noting that the existence of
a confidential relationship is the basis for trade secret protection). There are no cases
imposing liability for disclosure of confidentialpersonal information under these areas
of the law, probably because, as one commentator put it, "trade secrets and literary
works are essentially property and confidential personal information is not." Vickery,
supra note 35, at 1457 n.155.
66 64 F. 280 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894).
67 See id. at 281. The court held, however, in favor of the defendants-innocent
third-party purchasers of the photographs-because they were not parties to the
confidential relationship between the photographer and inventor and had no notice
of wrongful conduct. See id. at 282.
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confidence tort in American jurisprudence following its introduction in Corliss.
The paucity of breach of confidence cases was probably due to
the rise of the private-facts tort following Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis's seminal 1890 Harvard Law Review article, The Right to
Privacy.68 In arguing for an invasion of privacy tort, Warren and
Brandeis rejected the breach of confidence approach as providing
too limited a protection of privacy interests:
The narrower doctrine [of breach of trust or confidence] may have
satisfied the demands of society at a time when the abuse to be
guarded against could rarely have arisen without violating a
contract or a special confidence; but now that modern devices
afford abundant opportunities for the perpetration of such wrongs
without any participation by the injured party, the protection
granted by the law must be placed upon a broaderfoundation....
[T]he doctrines of contract and trust are inadequate to support the
required protection, and the law of tort must be resorted to. The
right of property in its widest sense.., embracing the right to an
inviolate personality, affords alone the broad basis upon which the
protection which the individual demands can be rested.
Thus, the courts, in searching for some principle upon which
the publication of private letters could be enjoined, naturally came
upon the ideas of a breach of confidence, and of an implied
contract; but it required little consideration to discern that this
doctrine could not afford all the protection required, since it
would not support the court in granting a remedy against a
stranger; and so the theory of property in the contents of letters
was adopted.

69

Most jurisdictions accepted Warren and Brandeis's argument
alleging the inherent superiority of the "broader" right to privacy

68 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 38; see also Vickery, supra note 35, at 1455
(speculating that the breach of confidence tort fell out of favor because breaches of
a personal nature "were handled by resort to the new right of privacy, the birth and
explosive growth of which corresponds with the period of dormancy in breach of
confidence"). In their article, Warren and Brandeis concluded that "existing law
affords a principle which may be... invoked to protect the privacy of the individual
from invasion." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 38, at 206.
69 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 38, at 210-11 (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added).
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approach to privacy protection, 70 and the breach of confidence
71
cause of action fell into a period of dormancy.
In the past three decades, however, with the private-facts tort in
decline, 72 the breach of confidence cause of action has experienced something of a renaissance in American common law. 73 In
recent years, courts have returned to the breach of confidence
approach to enforce duties of confidentiality in relationships as
diverse as physician-patient, 74 psychiatrist-patient, 75 schoolstudent,76 attorney-client, 7 7 priest-penitent, 78 banker-custom70 See infra note 86 and accompanying text. An interesting legal anomaly exists
between the English and American approaches to protection of informational privacy.
American courts, which are obligated by the First Amendment to ensure the free flow
of information, adopted Warren & Brandeis's "broader" (more protective) approach
to privacy protection. English courts, which have no corresponding constitutional
obligation, adopted the more limited breach of confidence approach. One would
expect that the country with constitutional protection of free speech would have
pursued the narrower breach of confidence approach more passionately.
71 In the period between Corliss in 1894 and the 1960s, one commentator found
only six cases where breach of confidence of a personal nature was a potential factor.
See Vickery, supra note 35, at 1454 n.146. Those cases are: Bazemore v. Savannah
Hosp., 155 S.E. 194 (Ga. 1930) (deciding on privacy grounds a case alleging breach
of confidence when hospital attendant took picture of deformed child); Douglas v.
Stokes, 149 S.W. 849 (Ky. 1912) (involving an implied contract suitby a father against
a photographer who made extra copies of a picture of the father's deformed child,
and although inconsistent with contract theory, awarding damages for emotional
distress); Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831 (Neb. 1920) (finding implied action for
disclosure of secrets in physician licensing statute but holding for doctor after finding
a qualified privilege where necessary to prevent spread of disease); Munzer v.
Blaisdell, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944) (holding that statute implied cause of
action prohibiting mental institution from disclosing patient medical records), aff'd
mem., 58 N.Y.S.2d 359 (App. Div. 1945); Clayman v. Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543
(C.P. Phila. County 1940) (holding that in taking picture of patient's disfigured face
doctor breached both implied contract and confidence); Smith v. Driscoll, 162 P. 572
(Wash. 1917) (affirming that doctor who breaches a patient's confidence can be held
liable, but holding that doctor involved was privileged to disclose such information
in court proceeding if material and relevant).
72 See infra notes 85-187 and accompanying text.
73 See generally Vickery, supra note 35, at 1428-34 (analyzing the re-emergence of
the breach of confidence tort in professional relationships).
74 See, e.g., Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527, 534 (Or. 1985)
(recognizing a cause of action by a patient against her physician for breach of
confidentiality).
75 See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 674 (App. Div. 1977) (finding that a
physician's duty of confidentiality toward her patient "is particularly and necessarily"
strong in a psychiatric relationship).
76 See e.g., Blair v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 6, 324 N.Y.S.2d 222, 227 (Dist. Ct.
1971) (characterizing a student's relationship with her school as "special or
confidential").
77 See, e.g., Beal v. Mars Larsen Ranch Corp., 586 P.2d 1378, 1383 (Idaho 1978)
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er, 79 and reporter-source.8 0 The courts that have ventured into
the breach of confidence area thus far have limited the scope of the
tort to the disclosure of information divulged in relationships
traditionally understood to be bound by a duty of confidentiality,
81
that is professional and quasi-professional relationships.
(recognizing in dictum that "[t]he relationship of client and attorney is one of trust").
7s See e.g., Snyder v. Evangelical Orthodox Church, 264 Cal. Rptr. 640, 647 (Ct.
App. 1989) (holding that unless serving a religious purpose, clergy's disclosure of
penitents' confidential communications could be actionable without violating the First
Amendment).
79 See e.g., Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (Idaho 1961)
("'[I]t is an implied term of the contract between a banker and his customer that the
banker will not divulge to third persons.., any information relating to the customer
acquired through the keeping of his account.'") (quoting 7 AM. JUR. Banks § 196
(1937)).
go See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2515 (1991) (holding that
the First Amendment does not bar a news source from recovering damages against
a newspaper for breaching a promise of confidentiality).
81 See, e.g., Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, 492 A.2d 580, 591 (D.C. 1985) (stating that
the tort arises from a "limited duty that attaches to 'nonpersonal relationships
customarily understood to carry the obligation of confidence'") (quoting Vickery,
supra note 35, at 1460 (emphasis omitted)). The obligations of confidentiality
recognized in these cases are founded on the laws of agency and trusts. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 (1958) (stating that an agent "has a duty
to the principal not to use or to disclose to third persons.., in competition with the
principal or to his injury.., confidential matters given to him only for the principal's
use"); RESTATEMENT OF REsTrrTriON § 200 (1936) ("Where a fiduciary in violation of
his duty to the beneficiary acquires property through the use of confidential
information, he holds the property so acquired upon a constructive trust for the
beneficiary.").
Because of potential problems with extending these areas of the law to personal
relationships, see supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text, courts have required the
existence of a fiduciary relationship before finding that an obligation of confidentiality attaches. States one commentator:
If the law recognized an inherent duty between friends always to act for the
benefit of the other, betrayals of any magnitude would be actionable on the
basis of there existing a personal relationship. For that reason, courts have
generally required that fiduciary obligations exist between the parties before
a relationship with legally binding duties will be recognized.
Katz, supra note 1, at 821-22 (footnotes omitted). The definition of a "fiduciary
relationship" has, therefore, been limited. See REsTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra,
§ 190 cmt. a (giving as examples of commonly recognized fiduciary relationships "the
relation of trustee and beneficiary, guardian and ward, agent and principal, attorney
and client").
Some courts have, however, been more flexible in defining fiduciary relationships. See; e.g., Detroit Lions, Inc. v. Argovitz, 580 F. Supp. 542, 547 (E.D. Mich.
1984) ("A fiduciary relationship arises not only from a formal principal-agent
relationship, but also from informal relationships of trust and confidence."); ef. Fraser
v. Evans, [1969] 1 Q.B. 349, 361 (Eng. C.A.) ("No person is permitted to divulge to
the world information which he had received in confidence unless he has just cause
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Recently, however, in Florida Star v. B.J.F.,8 2 the Supreme Court
indicated its potential openness to an expansion of the concept of
confidentiality to protect personal privacy in non-professional
relationships.8 3 Following the Court's lead, this Comment proposes a "limited" right to personal privacy (albeit not restricted to
professional relationships) based on breach of confidence. As Part
II will demonstrate, because the private-facts' "broader" approach
to privacy protection overly infringes on the First Amendment, it
has never fulfilled the great expectations of its creators. s4 As Parts
III and IV will argue, breach of confidence, condemned by Warren
and Brandeis to the backwater of American common law for seventy
years, may yet prove to be the proverbial tortoise to their privatefacts hare.
II. THE DEATH OF THE PRIVATE-FACTS TORT

Few articles have had as pronounced an effect on the legal
community as Warren and Brandeis's The Right to Privacy.85 In the
century since they argued for the existence of common law privacy
protection, most jurisdictions have recognized a cause of action in
tort for public disclosure of private facts, as well as for a wide range
of other invasions of privacy.86 Remarkably, the broad acceptance
or excuse for doing so.").
82 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989).
83 For a discussion of this proposition, see infra notes 174-179 and accompanying
text. See also Duchess of Argyll v. Duke of Argyll, [1965] 2 W.L.R. 789 (Eng. Ch.
1964) (British court enforcing a duty of confidentiality between a husband and wife).
84 As one commentator put it:
The constitutional dilemma posed by the Warren-Brandeis tort inevitably
implicates the companion problem of the failure of this branch of law to
protect plaintiffs. The confusion that has attended the effort to create a
firm legal contour for the tort merely reflects the inherent difficulty under
the first amendment of treating truthful speech as tortious.
Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 293 (footnote omitted).
8 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 38. One commentator described the article as
the "most influential law review article of all." Harry Kalven,Jr., Privacy in Tort LawWere Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327 (1966).
86 See LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CTR., 50-STATE SURVEY 1989: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MEDIA LIBEL AND INVASION OF PRIvACY LAw, 964-67 (Henry R. Kaufman
ed., 1989) [hereinafter PRIvACY SURVEY] (state-by-state survey of important invasion
of privacy cases). Forty-three jurisdictions have recognized a general invasion of
privacy tort, while three have explicitly rejected it, and four have either no rulings or
contradictory rulings on the issue. See id. The private-facts tort branch of the privacy
tort which is the subject of this Comment, see supra note 18, has been specifically
recognized in twenty-nine jurisdictions, while six have explicitly rejected it, and fifteen
have no, or contradictory rulings on the issue. See PRIVACY SURVEY, supra, at 964-67.
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of the private-facts tort has produced very few successful actions for
plaintiffs; in a review of state case law, one commentator found
fewer than eighteen cases in which the plaintiff either won an award
or stated a cause of action sufficient to withstand a motion for
summary judgment or a motion to dismiss.8 7 The scarcity of
successful private-facts tort actions has moved commentators to call
it a "phantom tort,"88 and "a pretty small mouse"89 alive "only
90
in the minds of academics."
This section will investigate the reasons for the impotence of the
private-facts tort; a detailed understanding of its inadequacies is
necessary in order to appreciate fully the strengths of the proposed
breach of confidence approach. Before entering into a discussion
of the private-facts case law, however, it will be helpful to briefly
delineate the privacy interests that commentators have advanced as
being protected by the tort.
A. The Interests Protected by the Private-FactsTort
Neither courts nor commentators have ever reached a consensus
either as to what "privacy" is or what interests it protects. These
questions alone have spawned an immense amount of commen92
tary91 that ultimately proves inconclusive.
87 See Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 293 n.5; see also Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the
Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421,457 (1980) (noting the "relative rarity of legal actions"
in this area); Alfred Hill, Defamationand Privacy Underthe FirstAmendment, 76 CoLUM.
L. REv. 1205, 1268 (1976) (referring to "the extraordinary scarcity of cases in which
liability has been imposed on the media solely on the ground of an embarrassing
disclosure"); Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy,News, and
Social Change, 1890-1990,80 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 1992) (manuscript at 66
n.92, on file with the author) ("Successful privacy cases have never been legion. And
recent experience is, if anything, worse, both as to the frequency of successful claims
and as to the analytical difficulties associated with rationalizing a favorable result.").
88 Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 362.
89 Kalven, supra note 85, at 337.
90 Bezanson, supra note 87, at 65.
91 See; e.g., David L. Bazelon, ProbingPrivacy, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 587, 592 (1977);
EdwardJ. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser,
39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1003 (1964); Gavison, supranote 87, at 423; Kalven, supra note
85, at 329 & n.22; Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 398,
408 (1978); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundationsof Privacy: Community and Self in
the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REv. 957 (1989); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL.
L. REV. 383,396 (1960); Warren & Brandeis, supranote 38, at 211; Zimmerman, supra
note 36, at 323.
92 See Raymond Wacks, The Poverty of "Privacy," 96 LAW Q. REv. 73, 75 (1980)
(arguing that "[t]he long search for a 'definition' of 'privacy' has produced a
continuing debate that is often sterile and, ultimately, futile").
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In general, commentators' valuation of the interests promoted
by the tort reflect their opinion concerning the significance of the
tort itself. Commentators arguing in favor of enforcement of the
tort believe that privacy fosters interests of great importance and
therefore must be protected. These commentators have asserted
that privacy is essential to the preservation of "individuality and
human dignity,"93 "an inviolate personality,"94 "rules of civility, "9 or "liberty, autonomy, selfhood, ... human relations, and
furthering the existence of a free society."96 Commentators less
enamored of the private-facts tort have argued that privacy protects
"'largely mythical' 97 or "inconsequential"9 8 interests, i.e. "reputation," 99 "hypersensitivity, " 1°° "dislike of publicity," 10 1 or a
desire to defraud society through concealment, 10 2 and therefore
does not warrant legal recognition. It is beyond the scope of this
Comment to reach a conclusion on the definition of privacy or on
the value of the interests it is supposed to protect. Suffice it to say
that the fundamental ambiguity on which the private-facts tort is
based has contributed to its poor showing in clashes with the strong,
103
constant, and ascertainable values of the First Amendment.
To say, however, that First Amendment interests outweigh
privacy interests when they are placed in direct conflict, is not to say
that privacy interests merit no protection. The sheer number of
jurisdictions that have recognized the private-facts tort and other
privacy-related causes of action 10 4 offers eloquent testimony to
our society's belief that privacy is worth protecting.10 5 As the
next two sections further demonstrate, the failure of the Warren
and Brandeis tort is not a consequence of the inadequacy of privacy
93 Bloustein, supra note 91, at 1003. Professor Bazelon makes a similar argument.
See Bazelon, supra note 91, at 592.
" Warren & Brandeis, supra note 38, at 211.
95 Post, supra note 91, at 959.
96 Gavison, supra note 87, at 423.
97 Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 335 n.237 (quoting DON PEMBER, PRIVACY AND
THE PRESS: THE LAW, THE MASS MEDIA, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 238 (1972)).
98 Harvey L. Zuckman, Invasion of Privacy-Some Communicative Torts Whose Time
Has Gone, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 253, 261 (1990).
99 Posner, supra note 91, at 408.
100 Kalven, supra note 85, at 329 & n.22.
101 Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 323.
102 See id. at 324.

103 See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
104 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
'05 The Supreme Court has also advocated the legal protection of privacy
interests. See infra notes 174-179 and accompanying text.
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interests, but rather of the definitional and constitutional infirmities
of the tort created to protect them.
B. The Lower Court Developments1°
106 An analysis of the private-facts tort is complicated by the fact that its
enforcement is seemingly governed by two separate bodies of law: the lower court
decisions and the Supreme Court decisions. Although the Supreme Court's holdings
must be adopted by the lower courts where applicable, the Court has handed down
only four private-facts decisions, the scope of which have arguably been limited. See
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524,536 (1989) (limiting its decision to "hold only that
where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained,
punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state
interest of the highest order, and that no such interest is satisfactorily served by
imposing liability [in this case]"); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 10506 (1979) (narrowing the issue to whether the state had the power to punish a
newspaper for truthfully publishing the identity of an alleged juvenile delinquent
where that information was lawfully obtained); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District
Court, 430 U.S. 308, 310 (1977) (per curiam) (holding only that publication of
information disseminated at an open juvenile detention hearing could not be
punished); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (limiting its
decision to "whether the State may impose sanctions on the accurate publication of
the name of a rape victim obtained from public records-more specifically, from
judicial records which are maintained in connection with a public prosecution and
which themselves are open to public inspection"). Consequently, it is difficult to
determine the effect of the Court's holdings on the common law in general. See
FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 530 n.5 (stating that in comparison to the Court's "long line
of decisions" which have "well-mapped [the] area of defamatory falsehoods," the
Court's private-facts cases "have not... exhaustively considered" the conflicts in that
area, leaving it "somewhat uncharted" as a result); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
supra note 18, § 652D Special Note on Relation of § 652D to the First Amendment
to the Constitution (acknowledging that the Supreme Court's private-facts cases have
been limited in scope and stating that therefore "[p]ending further elucidation by the
Supreme Court, this Section has been drafted in accordance with the current state of
the common law of privacy and the constitutional restrictions on that law that have
been recognized as applying").
Thus, both the paucity of cases and their limited holdings make it difficult to
assess the contemporary effectiveness of the private-facts tort by studying Supreme
Court decisions alone. However, the decisions do make clear the Court's increasing
rejection of the common law balancing of privacy and First Amendment interests in
favor of a more absolutist approach catering to the interests of the press-defendant.
See infra notes 144-173 and accompanying text. This move toward a more absolutist
approach is better understood after an examination of the infirmities inherent in the
lower court's formulation of the tort. See infra notes 107-143 and accompanying text.
Finally, although it is argued in this Comment that the Court's most recent
private-facts decision, Florida Star, supra, effectively eliminates any protection of
privacy interests that the lower courts may have provided plaintiffs, see infra notes
153-173 and accompanying text, recent changes in the composition of the Court
could result in a reversal of that holding and a return to the lower courts' balancing
test. See infranote 173. In support of its proposed tort, this Comment will therefore
attempt to show that neither the lower courts' nor the Supreme Court's formulation
of the private-facts tort is an adequate remedy for private-facts plaintiffs.
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Most jurisdictions that have recognized the private-facts cause
of action have adopted the Restatement's formulation of the
tort. 10 7

The Restatement requires private-facts plaintiffs to prove

four elements: 1) publicity, given to 2) private facts, 3) that would
4) that does not
be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
1 08
reveal information of legitimate public concern.
Even a cursory review of these elements reveals that the
publicity prong necessarily targets the press for liability. Indeed, it
is rare that a non-media defendant will be able to disclose private
information to "so many persons that the matter must be regarded
as substantially certain to become one of the public knowledge," as
the publicity prong of the Restatement's test requires. 1°9 The
rationale for this element of the tort is more practical than
principled; as one commentator remarked, the element is really just
judges' "tacit[] or express[]" recognition "that they would create an
if they subjected back-fence and front-parlor
impossible legal tangle
1 10
gossip to liability."
Although pragmatic, the publicity requirement assures that the
great majority of private-facts cases are necessarily brought against
See, e.g., Heath v. Playboy Enters., 732 F. Supp. 1145, 1148 (S.D. Fla. 1990);
Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, 492 A.2d 580,589 n.2 (D.C. 1985); Roshto v. Hebert, 439
So. 2d 428,430 (La. 1983); Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 502 A.2d 1101 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1980); Y.G. & L.G. v. Jewish Hosp., 795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App.
1990); Montesano v. Donrey Media Group, 668 P.2d 1081 (Nev. 1983); Strutner v.
Dispatch Printing Co., 442 N.E.2d 129 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982). Not all jurisdictions
adopt the Restatement formulation of the tort, but its application is wide enough to
warrant its use as the basis of this analysis. See Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 299
(asserting that the Restatement formulation of the tort is "widely relied upon by the
courts").
108 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 18, § 652D.
109 See id. at § 652D cmt. a. For cases in support of this proposition, see, e.g.,
Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 327 A.2d 133, 137-38 (Pa. 1974) (holding that "notification
of two or four third parties [concerning plaintiff's debt] is not sufficient to constitute
publication"); Nagy v. Bell Tel. Co., 436 A.2d 701, 703 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (holding
that telephone company's disclosure of plaintiff's telephone number to her estranged
and abusive husband did not constitute publicity). There are, however, some cases
in which non-media defendants have violated the publicity prong. See, e.g., Vassiliades,
492 A.2d at 586-90 (holding that plastic surgeon's circulation of "before" and "after"
photos of plaintiff in department store presentation amounted to publicity); Lambert
v. Dow Chem. Co., 215 So. 2d 673, 675 (La. Ct. App. 1968) (holding that employer's
inclusion of picture of plaintiff's mangled leg in company safety brochure was
publicity); Harris v. Easton Publishing Co., 483 A.2d 1377, 1385-86 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1984) (holding that communication of private information to a group of 17
individuals constituted publicity).
110 Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 337.
107
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media defendants.1 1 1
The requirement, therefore, fuels the
underlying conflict between the private-facts tort and the First
Amendment. As the Supreme Court has noted in assessing the
private-facts tort: "[b]ecause the gravamen of the claimed injury is
the publication of information, whether true or not, the dissemination
of which is embarrassing or otherwise painful to an individual, it is
here that claims of privacy most directly confront the constitutional
freedoms of speech and press. The face-off is apparent .... "112
In its defamation decisions, the Supreme Court has demonstrated
the importance in such "face-offs" of allowing a measure of
"breathing room" for the press. 113 Standards that fail to accurately forewarn the press of liability are unconstitutional in that
overestimation of liability and litigation risk may unduly encourage
press self-censorship.1 14 Members of the press "[would] tend to
make only statements which 'steer far wider of the lawful zone'"
than is necessary, thereby dampening the "vigor and limit[ing] the
variety of public debate."115
The publicity element and the
constitutional clash it invokes11 6 have made courts wary of broad

'11See Bezanson, supra note 87, at 32 ("The privacy tort visits liability on the point
of publication, a fact dictated by the legal requirement of 'publicity.' It is therefore
no great surprise that the vast bulk of privacy actions concern news.") (footnote
omitted). See infra notes 123 & 128 for exemplary cases.
112 Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1975) (emphasis added).
113 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (justifying its
actual malice rule in defamation cases lest the press "be deterred from voicing their
criticism ... because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the
expense of having to do so"). Outside the Court, at least one commentator has also
stated the view that
[amny satisfactory standard of liability must allow the press 'breathing space.'
It must not force the press into self-censorship, or in any way force it to
refrain from legitimate expression, by reason of uncertainty as to where the
boundaries lie, fear of costly litigation, or a desire to avoid possible trouble.
Thomas I. Emerson, The Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 329, 344 (1979).
114 See Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("The
threat of being put to the defense of a lawsuit... may be as chilling to the exercise
of First Amendment freedoms as fear of the outcome of the lawsuit itself.... ."), cert.
denied,
11 5 385 U.S. 1011 (1967).
New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279.
116 In a similar vein, Professor Zimmerman argues that the publicity requirement
places the private-facts tort on questionable constitutional grounds in that it
[i]mmediately taints the tort because it suggests that in this area the press
has significantly less freedom of speech than does a private individual. The
Supreme Court ... has never held that the press enjoys less protection than
individuals under the first amendment or that its special role as mass
communicator can subject it to special burdens.
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interpretations of the tort that might
unconstitutionally infringe
11 7
upon the press's "breathing room."
Unfortunately, even though there has been pressure on courts
to discern clear lines between allowable and tortious speech, "the
elements of the tort.., have remained so conceptually vague that
they offer little guidance to the judges and jurors who must decide
private-facts cases." 118 Even commentators who are partial to the
tort admit the vagueness of its elements. 119 The guidelines
Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 301.
11
7 Se e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,496 (1975) (asserting
in a private-facts case that a rule which would expose "the press to liability for
truthfully publishing information released to the public in official court records"
would "invite timidity and self-censorship and very likely lead to the suppression of
many items that would otherwise be published and that should be made available to
the public"); Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1981)
(stating that the Restatement "properly restricts liability for-public disclosure of private
facts to the extreme case, thereby providing the breathing space needed by the press
to properly exercise effective editorialjudgment"). Another court put it as follows:
The right of privacy is unquestionably limited by the right to speak and
print. It may be said that to give liberty of speech and of the press such
wide scope as has been indicated would impose a very serious limitation
upon the right of privacy; but, if it does, it is due to the fact that the law
considers that the welfare of the public is better subserved by maintaining
the liberty of speech and of the press than by allowing an individual to
assert this right of privacy in such a way as to interfere with the free
expression of one's sentiments, and the publication of every matter in which
the public may be legitimately interested.
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 74 (Ga. 1905). For a discussion of
the related newsworthiness defense, see infra notes 125-131 and accompanying text.
118 Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 301.
119 For example, Professor Peter Edelman, an advocate of the private-facts tort,
acknowledges that "line-drawing that would be necessary to ... determine when a fact
about a private person is not of legitimate interest to the public, is not at all simple."
Peter B. Edelman, Free Pressv. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost ofJutice Black, 68 TELx
L. REV. 1195, 1233 (1990). Another advocate, Professor Stanley Ingber, admits that
there is no "general agreement as to what constitutes an intimate issue." Stanley
Ingber, Rethinking IntangibleInjuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REV. 772, 843
(1985). Similarly, Professor Robert C. Post concedes that the "common law is deeply
confused and ambivalent" about the application of the tort's "legitimate public
concern" element, see Post, supra note 91, at 1007, and concedes that the tort's
"offensiveness" and "private facts" elements do not "depend upon a neutral or
objective measure of when disclosures should be subject to legal liability" but on
"social norms" that have a "socially determined variability." Id. at 986.
Critics of the private-facts tort of course have nothing complementary to say on
this point. See e.g., Kalven, supra note 85, at 326; Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 343
("[Even] after all the years devoted to the task [of finding clear and precise
demarcations between protected and unprotected speech in the private-facts area],
no one has yet developed a set of satisfactory and uniformly applied definitional
standards.").
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provided in the Restatement for the tort's elements are singularly
unrevealing: publicity is highly offensive when it is "of a kind highly
offensive to the ordinary reasonable man"; 120 legitimate public
concern includes "news" that is defined by the "mores of the
community" 121 but is limited by "common decency. " 12 2 The
difficulty of divining from these vague and subjective guidelines
clear standards of "offensiveness," "news," or "the public interest"
has resulted in inconsistent judgments, 123 and has left the press
in a state of uncertainty:
[I]t is simply too much to ask of a journalist in even the best and
most reasoned editorial process that the peculiar circumstances
and sensitivities of the subject be assessed, and that these be
balanced off against hopelessly ambiguous questions of ...
offensiveness in a community, and legitimacy of public inter12 4
est.
120 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 18, § 652D cmt. c.
121 Id. at cmt. g.

Id. at cmt. h.
123 Compare Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809-10 (2d Cir.)
(examining magazine's "merciless" expos6 of intimate details about an individual who
was a former mathematical prodigy and holding that there was nothing in the
publication which was objectionable to the normal person), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711
(1940) with Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93-94 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (finding
publication of the plaintiff's name in a film divulging her "past life" as a prostitute to
be an unnecessary and tortious invasion of privacy). Compare Gautier v. Pro-Football,
Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 489 (N.Y. 1952) (holding that "one attending a public event
122

such as a professional football game ... may be [televised] as part of the general
audience, but may not be picked out of a crowd alone, thrust upon the screen and
unduly featured for public view") with Cox Communications, Inc. v. Lowe, 328 S.E.2d
384, 386-87 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (finding no liability for photographing a prisoner
who is walking across a prison yard). CompareGill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 253 P.2d
441,444 (Cal. 1953) (holding that husband and wife, by engaging in an affectionate
pose in public view, had "waived their right of privacy so far as this particular public
pose was assumed") with Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding
that wild bodysurfer's bizarre behavior at public parties, including proclivity for
putting out cigarettes on his body, was not public behavior), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998
(1976). Compare Rawlins v. Hutchison Publishing Co., 543 P.2d 988, 993-96 (Kan.
1975) (holding that lapse of time since criminal activity does not restore an
individual's right to privacy concerning that activity) with Briscoe v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34,39-41 (Cal. 1971) (holding that lapse of time since criminal activity
does restore right of privacy). CompareMcSurelyv. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88,113 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985) (holding that disclosure to a husband of his
wife's premarital love letters satisfied the "publicity" requirement) with Pemberton v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 502 A.2d 1101 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 984
(1986) (holding that disclosure to wife of husband's extramarital affair did not satisfy
the "publicity" requirement).
124 Bezanson, supra note 87, at 67.
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In acknowledgment of both the impossibility of drawing clear
lines in this area and the very real possibility of chilling free speech
if they do not, many courts have interpreted the "public interest" or
"newsworthiness" element of the tort broadly, 125 thereby severely
limiting the liability of the press.1 2 6 The case law in this area
suggests that courts avoid line-drawing as to what is and is not
"news" and instead allow journalists' editorial decisions to define
the scope of what is essentially a defense to liability. "[M]ostjudges
... simply accept the press's judgment about what is and is not
newsworthy.... [T]he vast majority of cases seem to hold that what
is printed is by definition of legitimate public interest." 12 7 Cases
that have held for the press based on the perceived "newsworthiness" of some bit of information are legion. 128 "News," said one
125 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 18, § 652D & cmt. g. Courts

alternatively call this defense the "public interest defense," the "newsworthiness
defense," or the "legitimate public concern" defense. See id.
126 See Spahn v.Julian Messner, Inc., 221 N.E.2d 543, 544-45 (N.Y. 1966) ("[E]ver
mindful that the written word or picture is involved [in private-facts cases], courts
have engrafted exceptions and restrictions onto the statute to avoid any conflict with
the free dissemination of thoughts, ideas, newsworthy events, and matters of public
interest.").
127 Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 353 (footnotes omitted). In support of this
assertion, Zimmerman cites: Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447, 451-452
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 921 (1958); Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.,
79 F. Supp. 957,960-61 (D. Minn. 1948); Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune
Co., 283 N.W.2d 289, 302 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980). Prosser &
Keeton have also acknowledged this trend of deference to the press:
To a very great extent the press, with its experience or instinct as to what
its readers will want, has succeeded in making its own definition of news, as
a glance at any morning newspaper will sufficiently indicate. It includes...
matters of genuine, if more or less deplorable, popular appeal.
...

[The point being that if the press thought there was enough

justification for publication of the truth as news then it always would be in
the public interest not to subject the press to harassing lawsuits about the
appropriateness of a discrete publication.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 19, § 117, at 860-61, 862. See also Florida Star v.
B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524,553 (1989) (noting that "after a brief period early in this century
where Brandeis' view was ascendant... the trend in 'modern'jurisprudence has been
to eclipse an individual's right to maintain private any truthful information that the
press wished to publish").
128 See Rozhon v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 230 F.2d 359,361-62 (7th Cir. 1956)
(holding death by narcotics newsworthy); Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F.2d 467, 468
(D.C. Cir. 1946) (holding sedition newsworthy); Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113
F.2d 806,807 (2d Cir.) (holding newsworthy unauthorized publication of "merciless"
expos6 of former child prodigy nearly 30 years later), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940);
Frith v. Associated Press, 176 F. Supp. 671 (E.D.S.C. 1959) (holding arrest
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court, includes events and information which have "that indefinable
quality of interest which attracts public attention." 129 The comprehensiveness of this interpretation is readily apparent. Any piece
of information could be of interest to some section of the public.
Even if a court were to adopt a narrower interpretation of the
"newsworthiness" element, for example, that disclosure of the
information must have some "beneficial" social value in order for it
to be in the public interest, exposure of most private facts could still
be exempted since, as one commentator put it, "[a]ll information is
potentially useful in some way to the public in forming attitudes and
values."13 0 It is evident then, that while the common law's broad
interpretation of the "newsworthiness" defense has provided the
constitutionally required "breathing room" for the press, it has left
private-facts plaintiffs without a remedy. As Professor Kalven
defense is "so overpowering as
remarked in 1966, the newsworthy
13 1
virtually to swallow the tort."
On the other hand, the cases where the courts have held the press
liable for a private-facts invasion are limited in number13 2 and
difficult to categorize. One commentator has advanced the thesis
that the controlling principle underlying these decisions is that the
disclosures are of such a "shocking" or "offensive" character that
newsworthy); Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 669-70 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984) (holding that publicity concerning the sexual orientation of the plaintiff,
who had saved President Ford's life, was "newsworthy" and therefore not a violation
of privacy); Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 771-73 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983) (asserting that jury must weigh the newsworthiness of the past sex-change
operation of a local college president); Hubbard v.Journal Publishing Co., 368 P.2d
147 (N.M. 1962) (holding identity of crime victim newsworthy); Meetze v. Associated
Press, 95 S.E.2d 606, 609-10 (S.C. 1956) (holding 12-year old giving birth to a child
newsworthy); Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942) (holding woman's rare
eating disorder newsworthy); Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 95 P.2d 491, 495-96
(Cal. Dist. Ct. 1939) (holding suicide newsworthy); Jones v. Herald Post Co., 18
S.W.2d 972, 973 (Ky. Ct. App. 1929) (holding homicide newsworthy); supra note 106.
See also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 383-84 n.7 (1967) (listing 22 cases in which
lower courts held that freedom of press outweighed privacy interests).
'" Sweenek v. Pathe News, 16 F. Supp. 746, 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1936) (quoting
Associated Press v. International News Serv., 245 F. 244,248 (2d Cir. 1917), aff'd, 248
U.S. 215 (1918)); see also Meetle, 95 S.E.2d at 610 (interpreting the "newsworthiness"
requirement as including any information "which would naturally excite public
interest"). For examples of information that has been considered "news" by the
courts, see supra notes 123 & 128.
130 Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 351.
131 Kalven, supra note 85, at 336; see also Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 351
("[T]he process of defining 'newsworthy' information has practically destroyed the

private-facts tort as a realistic source of a legal remedy.").
132 See infra notes 134-137 for exemplary cases.
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they cannot be considered newsworthy. 3 3 Though a number of
cases are consistent with this principle,134 it is by no means

comprehensive. For example, the press has been held liable for
13 5
further publicizing information that was already quite public.
It is difficult to see how further disclosure of publicly known facts
amounts to unconscionable behavior on the part of the press. The
press has also been held liable for revelations of material that does
not seem to rise to the "shocking" level required by the principle.13 6 Finally, in some of the cases where the press has not been
held liable, the disclosures were arguably "shocking to the conscience."13 7 Therefore, it is unlikely that a general principle of
unconscionability is-or would be if universally recognized by the
courts-any less vague and subjective than the other elements of the
tort.
The conclusion that lower court private-facts decisions do not
reveal a coherent basis for the offensiveness exception to the
133 See Hill, supra note 87, at 1258. Professor Hill derives this principle from the

holding in Sidis v. F-R PublishingCorp., in which the court stated that it would allow
recovery in cases of "[r]evelations... [that are] so intimate and so unwarranted in
view of the victim's position as to outrage the community's notions of decency." Sidis
v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
Prosser and Keeton have tentatively endorsed this distinction. See PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 19, § 117, at 857 ("There is much to be said for Hill's approach
134 Most of these cases deal with nudity. See, e.g., McCabe v. Village Voice, Inc.,

550 F. Supp. 525, 529-30 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that publication of nude
photograph of plaintiff without her consent was actionable); Taylor v. K.T.V.B., Inc.,
525 P.2d 984, 987-89 (Idaho 1974) (holding that broadcasting a nude man arrested
in front of his house was actionable). Others cases deal with the publication of
unusual medical conditions. See e.g., Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291,296 (Mo.
1942) (holding that publication of woman's rare eating disorder without her consent
was actionable).
135 See Daily Times Democratv. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474,478 (Ala. 1964) (holding
newspaper liable for printing picture ofwoman's dress flying up); Briscoe v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 43 (Cal. 1971) (holding reports of previous criminal

activities of plaintiff actionable).
,36 See e.g., Huskey v. NBC, 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1289 (N.D. Il. 1986) (holding that
broadcasting a film of a prisoner with a distinctive tattoo was actionable).
, e.g., Sidis, 113 F.2d at 807 (holding unauthorized publication of "merciless"
expos6 of former child prodigy nearly 30 years later newsworthy). For a commentator who argues that Sidis was wrongly decided, see EDwARDJ. BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL
AND GRouP PRIVAcY 95 (1978). For other cases with especially sympathetic plaintiffs,
see Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 669 (Ct. App. 1984)
(holding publishing ofsexual orientation of plaintiff, who saved President Ford's life,
to be no violation of privacy in that it was "newsworthy"); Diaz v. Oakland Tribune,
Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 771-73 (Ct. App. 1983) (directing the jury to weigh the
newsworthiness of the past sex-change operation of a local college president).
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newsworthiness defense is just as damaging to First Amendment
interests as the broad newsworthiness defense is to privacy interests;
no clear principle can be discerned by which journalists can predict
when the courts will find an exception to the newsworthiness
defense. The constitutional ramifications of this situation moved
one commentator to advocate the complete rejection of the
"offensiveness" exception:
When we weigh the continued chilling effect of potential litigation
and unpredictable liability against the benefits of allowing courts
to retain the option of remedying some rare, genuinely offensive
bits of publicity, we must question whether the preservation of
even a small corner of the Warren-Brandeis
tort is worth the risks.
38
This observer answers in the negative.1
Beyond the constitutionality of the exception,1 3 9 its subjectivity
and vagueness also "chills" the privacy interests of private-facts
plaintiffs. Uncertainty concerning where the next court will draw
the line between privacy and freedom of speech dissuades privatefacts plaintiffs from engaging in costily, albeit meritorious, litigation.
If the private-facts plaintiff is a public figure, courts are even
less accommodating to her claims of invasion of privacy. Although
the Restatement would allow public figures a small degree of
privacy, 14 most jurisdictions deny public figures any chance of
recovery under the private-facts tort, reasoning that such personalities "had sought publicity and consented to it, and so cannot
complain of it; [and] that their personalities and their affairs [had]
already ... become public, and [could] no longer be regarded as
their own private business .... "141 By the mere act of becoming
a public figure, the individual thus waives her right to privacy. As
Kitty Kelley asserted upon learning that Frank Sinatra had dropped
his lawsuit trying to enjoin the publication of her unauthorized
biography of his life: "The life of a public figure belongs to us, the
142
average American citizen."
Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 362 (footnote omitted).
For a discussion of whether any of these common law exceptions to the
newsworthiness defense would be allowed under the Supreme Court's formulation
of the
private-facts tort, see infra note 170.
40
1 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 18, § 652D cmt. h ("There
may be some intimate details of her life, such as sexual relations, which even the
actress is entitled to keep to herself.").
141 PROSSER, supra note 91, at 411. See e.g., Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d
395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 294 N.Y.S.2d
122, 127 (Sup. Ct. 1968), affd, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (App. Div. 1969).
142 Katz, supra note 1, at 820 (quoting Connelly, Kitty Kelley's Battle with Sinatra,
138

139
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In summary, it is evident that the lower courts' formulation of
the private-facts tort does not effectively protect the privacy
interests at stake. The tort's focus on media defendants and the
inherently subjective nature of its elements have created a body of
law that, through the newsworthiness defense, heavily favors First
Amendment interests. In addition, the few points of light for
private-facts plaintiffs-the cases that have found "offensiveness"
exceptions to the newsworthy defense-do not lend themselves to
coherent principles upon which either the press or potential
plaintiffs can make reliable publication and litigation decisions.
These constitutional and definitional difficulties have so gutted the
common law formulation of the private-facts tort as to make its
enforcement against media-defendants highly unlikely. Private-facts
plaintiffs who are public figures have essentially no chance of
success. Commentators who dismiss new torts designed to protect
privacy interests because of their redundancy with the common law
private-facts tort1 43 have not fully considered the inadequate
protection of privacy interests that the Warren and Brandeis tort
has provided in practice.
C. The Supreme Court Developments
If the lower courts' approach to private-facts cases is heavily
biased toward the press, 144 then the Supreme Court's test for
restricting publication of truthful information positively capitulates
to it. The Court's decisions have relied exclusively on First
Amendment values, ignoring lower courts' attempts to balance these
values with competing privacy interests.1 4 5 While the Court has
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 15, 1984, at C14); see also Forsher v. Bugliosi, 608 P.2d 716,
726 (Cal. 1980) (stating that "'once a man has become a public figure, or news, he
remains a matter of legitimate recall to the public mind to the end of his days'")
(quoting Prosser, supra note 91, at 418); cf. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263
n.18 (1952) (stating that "public men, are, as it were, public property"). Butsee Gary
McDowell, PrivateLives, PervertedLaw, LEGAL TIMEs,June 10, 1991, at 22 (claiming
that the one element of Warren and Brandeis's tort most worth recovering "is the
idea that public status does not deny one a protected realm of privacy" and furthering
asserting that "[b]y taking seriously the idea that even public figures and officials have
a right to their privacy, we could restore appreciation for what privacy truly means").
143 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
144 See supra notes 125-131 and accompanying text.
145 See Edelman, supra note 119, at 1218 ("The line of decisions from Cox Broadcastingto FloridaStaris curiously ahistorical: no case acknowledges that state courts
have struggled throughout the twentieth century to accommodate first-amendment
values while developing common-law torts for invasions of privacy."). See supranotes
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decided only four private-facts cases,"1 4 its holdings have adopted
increasingly inflexible positions that ultimately renders a plaintiff
147
victory over the press implausible, if not impossible.
In the first of the Court's private-facts cases, Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 148 the Court held that the press could publish with
impunity any "truthful information contained in official court
records open to public inspection." 149 The Court's relatively
inflexible standard was singularly motivated by concern for freedom
of the press:
The conclusion [that a state may not impose sanctions on the
publication of truthful information found in public records] is
compelling when viewed in terms of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments and in light of the public interest in a vigorous
press ....
...
Public records by their very nature are of interest to those
concerned with the administration of government, and a public
benefit is performed by the reporting of the true contents of the
records by the media. The freedom of the press to publish that
information appears to us to be of critical importance to our type
of government in which the citizenry is the final judge of the
150
proper conduct of public business.

The Court explicitly rejected the common law approach of ad hoc
balancing of privacy and press interests: "[w]e are reluctant to
embark on a course that would make public records generally
available to the media but forbid their publication if offensive to the

107-143 and accompanying text for a discussion of the common law developments in
this area.
146 See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing
Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308
(1977) (per curiam); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
147 In all of its private-facts cases, the Court has held for the media-defendant.
See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541 (holding that a newspaper's publication of a rape
victim's name was not a tortious invasion of privacy if it was "lawfully obtained");
Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 104 (holding that newspaper's publication of juvenile
offender's name was not an invasion of privacy where the name was lawfully obtained
from police radio and eyewitness interviews); OklahomaPublishing,430 U.S. at 311-12
(finding no invasion of privacy when newspapers published name and picture of
juvenile delinquent obtained from a "closed" hearing but with full knowledge of
judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel); Cox Broadcasting,420 U.S. at 491 (holding
that the state may not "impose sanctions on the accurate publication of the name of
a rare victim obtained from public records").
48 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
149 Id. at 495.
'50 Id. at 495.
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sensibilities of the supposed reasonable man." 151 Still, while the
Court seemed unwilling to engage in any meaningful balancing of
the privacy interests involved in its decision, its holding was limited
in scope. The press was allowed free reign, but only with respect to
152
public records.
In its most recent private-facts decision, the Court cast an even
wider net to protect the publication of truthful information. In
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 15' the name of a rape victim, B.J.F., was
mistakenly included in a police report and released to the
press. 154 B.J.F.'s name was then printed in a newspaper in violation of a Florida statute prohibiting any person from publicizing the
name of a sexual assault victim in an instrument of mass communication. 155 B.J.F. sued based on the statutory prohibition and
Florida's private-facts tort.1 56 The Supreme Court held for the
media-defendants and advanced the rule that "'if a newspaper
lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public
significance then state officials may not constitutionhlly punish
publication of the information, absent a need to further a state
interest of the highest order. ' " 15 7 The Court stated that this
principle would ensure the "'public interest.., in the dissemination
of truth'", acknowledge that "punishing the press for its dissemination of information which is already publicly available is relatively
unlikely to advance [significant state interests]," prevent "'timidity
and self-censorship'" within the media, and still leave open the
possibility that states would safeguard significant privacy interests
158
by controlling information at its source.
151 Id. at 496.
152

The trend toward a more inflexible position favoring First Amendment

interests was continued in Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308
(1977) (per curiam), in which the Court held that a state cannot "prohibit the
publication of widely disseminated information obtained at court proceedings which
were in fact open to the public," regardless of the information's offensiveness. See
id. at 310. Again the Court indicated that First Amendment concerns were
motivating its decision: "[an opposite] order [would] abridge[] the freedom of the

press in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 311-12.

153 491 U.S. 524 (1989).

154 See id. at 527.
155 See id. at 526.
156 See id. at 528.
15 7
Id. at 533 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103
(1979)). Note that the Florida statute in question did not make the newspaper's
acquisition of the name unlawful,just its publication of it. Therefore, the Court was
able to find that the newspaper had obtained the information lawfully.
158 See id. at 533-36.
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Though the Court claimed that the "lawfully obtained" doctrine
was a "limited First Amendment principle," 159 it is in actuality an
absolutist rule ensuring that the media will very rarely, if ever, be
160
held liable for publishing truthful, albeit private, information.
The principle seems to leave open a limited possibility of liability
for publication of lawfully obtained information-that is, where there
is a showing of "a state interest of the highest order." 161 Still, it
is difficult to imagine a state interest more compelling than that
presented by B.J.F. 162-namely the interest in protecting victims
of sexual crimes from public scorn and repeat attacks. 163 While
the majority admitted that preserving the privacy of rape victims was
a "highly significant interest[]," it believed that the Florida statute's
imposition of "liability for publication" in this case was too
"precipitous a means" of achieving its goal. 164 The Court's very
demanding analysis of the statute found it to be overly harsh,
underinclusive, and unnecessary to achieving the State's interest in
protecting the identities of rape victims. 165 The Court's adoption
of what is essentially a strict scrutiny analysis 166 to examine the
159 Id. at 533.
160 See id. at 547 n.2 (White,J., dissenting) ("The Court's concern for a free press
is appropriate, but such concerns should be balanced against rival interests in a
civilized and humane society. An absolutist view of the former leads to insensitivity
as to the latter.").
161 Id. at 541.
162 See David A. Anderson, Torlous Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 71, 90 (1990)

("The Court insisted it was leaving open the possibility that publication of a rape
victim's name might be actionable under some circumstances, but if FloridaStarwas
not such a case, it is difficult to imagine a case that would be actionable."); Edelman,
supra note 119, at 1223 ("B.J.F.'s case could hardly have been more compelling....
[Considering the Court's rejection of her claim despite the facts of this case,] it is
difficult to imagine a plaintiff that the Court would allow to recover.").
16s After the report revealing B.J.F.'s name was published in the newspaper, her
mother (while caring for B.J.F.'s children) received a phone call from a man saying
he was B.J.F.'s rapist threatening to rape her again. Fearing for her safety, B.J.F.
moved and obtained mental health counseling. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 528.
1 4 See id. at 537.
165 The Court's "means" analysis faulted the State's statute on three grounds.
First, liability for truthful information was not the best means of protecting privacy
in that the State could have pursued the less drastic remedy of stricter enforcement
of confidentiality rules within its own departments. See infra note 196 and
accompanying text. Second, the Court found that the statute's imposition of liability
based on a negligence per se theory was unnecessarily harsh. See Florida Star, 491
U.S. at 539. Finally, the Court found the statute facially underinclusive in that it
targeted mass communication of rape victims' names, but did not prohibit the
"devastating" consequences of backyard gossips. See id. at 540.
166 The Court's "lawfully obtained" approach is comparable to its strict scrutiny
analysis of Equal Protection Clause cases and cases involving state attempts to control
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publication of truthful, albeit private, information does not bode
well for future private-facts plaintiffs. As Justice White wrote in
dissent, the Court's analysis denies any meaningful weighing of the
privacy interests at stake in private-facts cases, and essentially kills
the private facts tort:
By holding that only "a state interest of the highest order" permits
the State to penalize the publication of truthful information, and
by holding that protecting a rape victim's right to privacy is not
among those state interests of the highest order, the Court accepts
appellant's invitation... to obliterate... the tort of the publication of private facts.... Even if the Court's opinion does not say
as much today, such obliteration will follow inevitably from the
Court's conclusion here. If the First Amendment prohibits wholly
private persons (such as B.J.F.) from recovering for the publication
of the fact that she was raped, I doubt that there remain any
"private facts" which persons may assume will not be published in
167
the newspapers, or broadcast on television.
To the extent that the result under a strict scrutiny analysis is
something of a foregone conclusion, 168 private-facts plaintiffs'
success after FloridaStar will turn on that decision's other criterionwhether the information was "lawfully obtained."16 9 With "lawful-

the content of speech. See e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (explaining that when speech takes place in quintessential public
forums and the state seeks to enforce a content-based exclusion, the state "must show
that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end"). The analysis is similar in that the Court
engages in a very demanding examination of the ends and means of the state action.
15 FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 550-51 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see
also Sheldon W. Halpern, Rethinking the Right of Privacy: Dignity, Decency, and the
Law's Limitations, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 539, 558 (1991) ("Certainly, the refusal to

recognize the privacy interest in so compelling a set of facts as was presented in
FloridaStar 'seems to leave little vitality in the tort of disclosure of private facts.'")
(quoting Anderson, supra note 162, at 90).
168 See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979) (ChiefJustice
Burger, writing for the majority, concedes that "state action to punish the publication
of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards."). The Court has,
so far, always held that the publication of truthful information has overcome whatever
other interest was at stake. See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435
U.S. 829,834 (1978) (interest injudicial disciplinary proceeding confidentiality); Bates
v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 368-72 (1977) (interest in preserving lawyer professionalism); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 542 (1976) (interest in plaintiff's
right to a fair trial); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 749-50 (1976) (interest in preserving pharmacists' professionalism);
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 76 (1964) (interest of public figure in reputation).
169 See Edelman, supra note 119, at 1206 (arguing that the dispositive factor in the
Court's test in Florida Staris the concept of "lawful acquisition").
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ly obtained" as the new standard for the private-facts tort, however,
the media-defendants will almost always win.
"[T]he media
defendant now can publish virtually any private information
discovered through means that fall short of breaking and entering,
or violating a specific statute making the receipt of such information
170
criminal."
Following Florida Star, the resolution of private-facts cases no
longer revolves around the offensiveness of the information that is
17 1
published, but rather on the methods by which it was acquired.
The Court's approach effectively frees members of the media from
performing the difficult calculus demanded by the lower courts'
balancing of "newsworthiness" and "offensiveness". Instead, they
need only inquire whether the information was lawfully obtained.
Though the FloridaStar doctrine may provide the press with a large
degree of "breathing room," it does not provide a pivot on which
privacy interests are equitably balanced. As one commentator
noted:
The technically lawful acquisition of information does not ensure
that the material was already "public." Neither does the lawfulness
of acquisition mandate an unrestricted right to publish private
information....
...

Unlawfulness

in acquisition

should bear upon the

lawfulness of publication only if the unlawful acquisition reveals
the private nature of the information and suggests that the
information deserves protection from publication based on its
private or confidential status. Otherwise, the lawfulness of
170 Edelman,supra note 119, at 1204. Itis highly questionable whether any of the
lower court cases recognizing exceptions to the newsworthiness defense, see supra
notes 134-137, would have been decided the same way under the "lawfully obtained"
doctrine. In none of these cases did the press violate any law concerning its receipt
of the information. Thus, in future common law cases using the Court's constitutionally based "lawfully obtained" standard, it is unlikely that any exceptions to the
newsworthiness defense will be recognized.
171 See e.g., Heath v. Playboy Enters., 732 F. Supp. 1145, 1149 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (no
invasion of privacy when defendant published pictures legally purchased from
commercial photographer); Cape Publications, Inc. v. Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374,
1378 (Fla. 1989) (no invasion of privacy when case file was legally obtained from
prosecutor's secretary, who gave no caution as to confidentiality). Other lower courts,
however, have not whole-heartedly adopted the "lawfully obtained" doctrine in their
post-FloridaStar decisions. See e.g., Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1515,
1525-34 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (conducting both FloridaStar "lawfully obtained" analysis and
more explicit balancing of press and privacy interests); Y.G. & L.G. v.Jewish Hosp.,
795 S.W.2d 488, 498-99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (balancing "offensiveness" and
"newsworthiness" of publication). Resolution of this lower court confusion (or
feigned ignorance?) will have to await further Supreme Court consideration.
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of
acquisition is an inept measure of the competing interests
17 2
speech and privacy in the private-fact disclosure context.
The unlawfully obtained doctrine is essentially an absolutist
abdication to the First Amendment. As one commentator stated,
the Court in FloridaStar "decided that when the violation of privacy
involves publication of private information about an individual, free
1
speech wins; everything is newsworthy, and nothing is private." "3
Curiously, the Court has also made clear in its private-facts
decisions its belief that the underlying privacy interests which the
tort attempts to preserve merit legal protection. In Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 174 the first of the Court's private-facts cases, the
majority opinion asserted that "powerful arguments can be made,
and have been made, that however it may be ultimately defined,
there is a zone of privacy surrounding every individual, a zone
within which the State may protect him from intrusion by the press,
with all its attendant publicity." 175 The Court also quoted liberally from Warren and Brandeis' article advocating the recognition of
legal protection of the right to privacy. 1 76 Later decisions further
172 Edelman, supra note 119, at 1204-06 (footnotes omitted).
17 Id. at 1207. HadJustices Souter and Thomas replaced Justices Brennan and

Marshall before FloridaStar, the 5-4 holding may well have come out the other way,
especially if it were a matter of first impression. But see Edelman, supra note 119, at
1211 ("Right wing libertarians are never great enthusiasts for privacy except in cases
involving the protection of private property.... ."). However, even ifJustice White's
alternative analysis in the Florida Stardissent had obtained a majority's support, it
would not have brought about a resurgence in successful private-facts suits: it still
leaves much to be desired from the point of view of the private-facts plaintiff. White

allows that the "right to privacy is not absolute," acknowledging that "sometimes" the
public's right to know must "trump" the individual's privacy interest, and that striking
the appropriate balance between these two interests is "difficult." See FloridaStar,491
U.S. at 551 (White, J., dissenting). He concludes, rather weakly, that the majority
"accord[ed] too little weight to B.J.F.'s side of [the] equation, and too much on the
other." Id. His solution is to "draw the line higher on the hillside: a spot high
enough to protect B.J.F.'s desire for privacy and peace-of-mind in the wake of a
horrible personal tragedy." Id at 553. This method for deciding when an individual's
privacy interest should dominate over free speech and the press is little more than a
restatement of the vague "offensiveness" standard which has proven ineffective at
protecting privacy interests in the lower courts. See supra notes 132-137 and
accompanying text. The future for private-facts plaintiffs is not bright under either
the majority's "lawfully obtained" doctrine or the dissent's approach.
174 420 U.S. 469 (1975).

175 Id. at 487 (footnote omitted). Significantly, the Court cites Professor
Bloustein's article for support of this proposition. See id. at 487 n.14; see also
Bloustein, supra note 91, at 1003 (arguing that privacy is essential to "individuality
and human dignity"). The Court, therefore, clearly sides with the advocates of the
tort. See also Hill, supra note 87, at 1268 ("[T]he opinion of the Court in Cox
Broadcastingabundantly reveals the receptivity of the Court to possible liability.").
176 See Cox Broadcasting,420 U.S. at 487 n.16 ("'Of the desirability-indeed of the
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demonstrate the Court's respect for the privacy rights of privatefacts plaintiffs by "relying on limited principles that sweep no more
broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case." 177 Had
the Court really not "[r]espect[ed] the fact that ... privacy rights
are... 'plainly rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of
our society, ' " 178 it would have held that the disclosure's truthfulness is always a defense for media-defendants in private-facts cases,
179
a holding it has purposefully avoided.
After this review of the Supreme Court's private-facts decisions,
the obvious question arises: why has the Court, which ostensibly
believes that the privacy interests at stake are "sensitiv[e] and
significan[t],"18 0 never held for a private-facts plaintiff and instead
adopted an increasingly inflexible approach which also denies future
plaintiffs any meaningful chance of recovery? The answer is clear:
when First Amendment interests and privacy interests conflict, the
Supreme Court has tried to give the press adequate "breathing
room" by rejecting ad hoc balancing and drawing lines that, because
of their absolute clarity, do not chill First Amendment interests. 181 This tendency has necessitated the rejection of lower

necessity-of some such protection [of the right of privacy], there can, it is believed,
be no doubt.'") (quoting Warren & Brandeis, supra note 38, at 196).
177 Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989); see also Smith v. Daily Mail, 443
U.S. 97, 105-06 (1979) (narrowing the issue of the case to whether the state had the
power to punish a newspaper for truthfully publishing the identity of an alleged
juvenile delinquent, where that identity was lawfully obtained); Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (limiting its decision to "whether the State
may impose sanctions on the accurate publication of the name of a rape victim
obtained from public records-more specifically, from judicial records which are
maintained in connection with a public prosecution and which themselves are open
to public inspection").
178 Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 533.
179 See, e.g., id. at 533, 541 (refusing to hold "that truthful publication is
automatically constitutionally protected, or that there is no zone of personal privacy
within which the state may protect the individual from intrusion by the press, or even
that a state may never punish publication of the name of the victim of a sexual
offense"); Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103 (leaving open the possibility that a state may
punish the publication of lawfully obtained information when such punishment
"furthers an interest of the highest order"); Cox Broadcasting,420 U.S. at 491 (refusing
to address "whether the State may ever define and protect an area of privacy free
from unwanted publicity in the press"); see also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 383
n.7 (1967) (acknowledging in dictum the possibility that "truthful publication ...
could be constitutionally proscribed" in a false light privacy case if publication of the
information would be unconscionable).
180 FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 533.
181See id. at 535 (advancing as a rationale for the "lawfully obtained" doctrine that
"'timidity and self-censorship'"... may result from allowing the media to be punished
for publishing certain truthful information."); see also Zimmerman, supra note 36, at
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court attempts at balancing "newsworthiness" and "offensiveness"
in favor of the more predictable absolutist standards such as the Cox
Broadcasting "public records" 182 doctrine and the Florida Star

"lawfully obtained" 18 3 doctrine. 184
342-43 & n.270 ("The Court has stated repeatedly that vague proscriptions against
speech may chill the willingness of individuals and the media to take part in those
communicative activities that are clearly protected by the First Amendment. The
Court has developed the doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth to address this
concern.") (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974) (holding statute
prohibiting "contemptuous" treatment of American flag void because it provided
inadequate notice of forbidden conduct and invited selective enforcement)); Coates
v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (holding that vague statute violated First
Amendment); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (finding statute defining
solicitation of business unconstitutionally vague and overbroad)). See generally
Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: FirstAmendment Theoty
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935 (1968). Nimmer
remarks:
[A]d hoc balancing by hypothesis means that there is no rule to be applied,
but only interests to be weighed. In advance of a final adjudication by the
highest court a given speaker has no standard by which he can measure
whether his interest in speaking will be held of greater or lesser weight than
the competing interest which opposes his speech. Without pretending that
there can ever be complete certainty as to how a given rule will be applied
in a new situation, if there is no rule at all then there is no certainty at all.
Id. at 939.
182 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
18
3 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
184 Remarking on another of the Court's absolutist holdings, the Cox Broadcasting
"public records" principle, see supra note 150,Justice Brennan stated that "[c]rucial
to [that] holding.., was the determination that a 'reasonable man' standard for
imposing liability for invasion of privacy interests" is too vague to offer the press
adequate protection of their First Amendment interests. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424
U.S. 448, 474 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court in Florida Star was also
moved by an aversion to vague standards imposing liability at the point of
publication:
[An important] consideration is the 'timidity and self-censorship' which may
result from allowing the media to be punished for publishing certain
truthful information.... Cox Broadcastingnoted this concern with overdeterrence in the context of information made public through official court
records, but the fear of excessive media self-suppression is applicable as well
to other information released, without qualification, by the government. A
contrary rule, depriving protection to those who rely on the governments
implied representations of the lawfulness of dissemination, would force
upon the media the onerous obligation of sifting through government press
releases, reports, and pronouncements to prune out material arguably
unlawful for publication.
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535-36 (1989) (citations omitted). Professor
Zimmerman, relying on the Court's libel decisions, see, e.g., New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,272 (1964), predicted the Court's rejection of the common-law
approach to the private-facts tort six years before the FloridaStar decision:
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Implicit in the Court's approach is the belief that when placed
in direct conflict, First Amendment interests weigh more heavily
than the privacy interests underlying the private-facts tort. This is
not to say, however, that the privacy interests themselves do not
merit protection. Rather, the problem is that the private-facts tort,

by targeting the press for liability, i8 5 directly conflicts with the
First Amendment, and then depends on unconstitutionally vague
standards to mediate this conflict. 1 s8 Thus the private-facts tort's
formulation is the source of its own impotence. 187 The dilemma
presented by these conclusions is clear: how can privacy interests
be protected without imposing liability at the point of publication
and without employing vague standards that infringe First Amendment rights? The breach of confidence tort, advanced in the next
section, offers a response to this challenge.
III. THE CONFIDENTIALITY TORT: ITS SCOPE AND EXCEPTIONS

Part II's review of American decisions recognizing the privatefacts tort reveals a paradox:18 8 courts acknowledge the importance of preserving privacy interests, but are unwilling to enforce
the tort created to protect them.18 9 For those who believe that
19°
privacy is of profound consequence to human development,
19 1
this paradox is no mere legal anomaly but a gross absurdity;

The Supreme Court's experience with the political-speech doctrine in libel
law illustrates some of the difficulty in applying the equally broad newsworthiness standard, and suggests that the Court may be reluctant to approve
a body of tort law [i.e., the private-facts tort,] that employs such a nebulous
standard to distinguish between constitutionally protected and unprotected
speech.
Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 351.
'a5 See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1975) ("Because the
gravamen of the [private-facts tort] is the publication of information, whether true or
not, the dissemination of which is embarrassing or otherwise painful to an individual,
it is here that claims of privacy most directly confront the constitutional freedoms of
speech and press."); see also supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
186See supra notes 112-117 and accompanying text. As one commentator put it,
the Court's decision in FloridaStar "was driven more by concern for free speech and
press than by the perceived inadequacy of the privacy interest involved." Edelman,
supra note 119, at 1212.
187 See Bezanson, supra note 87, at 70-71 (arguing that the "fundamental problem
lies with the [private-facts] tort, not with privacy" and further suggesting that "[t]his
conclusion is not.., a wholly bleak one, for it does not imply that privacy is not a
value8 8to be legally protected" or "an idea without real and enforceable content").
1 See supra note 86.
189 See supra notes 125-131 and accompanying text.
190 See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
191 See Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publishing Co., 76 N.W.2d 762, 769 (Iowa
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the Supreme Court's resolution of this inconsistency in favor of the
press in FloridaStar v. B.J.F.192 provides further cause for alarm.
Responding to the dilemma that the First Amendment has
presented for the Warren-Brandeis tort, some commentators have
advocated duties of confidentiality as an alternative pivot on which
privacy and press interests can be accommodated. 9
For example, Professor Bezanson has recently suggested:

[W]hile the judgments of "private" information, "outrageous"
conduct, and "legitimate" public interest can never be wholly
escaped, and while their determination in an adjudicative setting
is problematical, they can perhaps be more closely captured in [a
cause of action] which takes the form, not of a tort action focused
on publication, but of identified information placed presumptively
in the control of the individual, with the focus of adjudication
being shifted from open-ended issues of value to the more
circumscribed questions of consent, waiver, and an obligation of
194
confidentiality owed by one possessing such information.
Similarly, although some commentators have declared Florida Star
the end of the line for privacy protection in America, 195 a close
reading of the opinion reveals that the Supreme Court is open to
controlling private information by holding sources of confidential
information liable for breach of confidence:
To the extent sensitive information rests in private hands, the
government may under some circumstances forbid its nonconsensual acquisition, thereby bringing outside of the [unlawfully
obtained] principle the publication of any information so acquired.
To the extent sensitive information is in the government's custody,
it has even greater power to ... classify certain information,

1956) (Larson, CJ., dissenting) (noting with frustration that although the private-facts
tort was recognized by the courts of the state, the majority was only willing to honor
it with "lip service").
192 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
195
See Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 363-64 (stating that the "right[] of
contractual confidentiality... merits considerably more thought as an alternative to
the Warren-Brandeis tort than it has received thus far").
194 Bezanson, supra note 87, at 71-72.
195 See FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 550 (White,J, dissenting) (claiming that the case
"obliterate[s] one of the most note-worthy legal inventions of the 20th-Century: the
tort of the publication of private facts"); Edelman, supra note 119, at 1206 ("The
Court in FloridaStar made a choice. It decided that when the violation of privacy
involves publication of private information about an individual, free speech wins;
everything is newsworthy, and nothing is private."); Zuckman, supra note 98, at 265
(agreeing withJustice White's belief thatFloridaStarhad effectively "obliterated" the
private-facts tort).
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establish and enforce procedures ensuring its redacted release, and
extend a damages remedy against the government or its officials where the
government's mishandlingof sensitive information leads to its dissemination....
... Once the government [i.e. the source] has placed such
information in the public domain, "reliance must rest upon the
judgment of those who decide what to publish or broadcast" and
hopes for restitution must rest upon the willingness of the government to
compensate victims for their loss of privacy and to protect them from the
other consequences of its mishandling
of the information which these
196
victims provided in confidence.
In its recent decision in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 197 the Court
went even further and allowed journalists to be held liable, under
a state's promissory estoppel law, for their breach of a promise of
confidentiality given to a source.1 9 8 Distinguishing its privatefacts cases, the Court asserted in Cohen that:
[iun those cases, the State itself defined the content of publications
that would trigger liability [and the tort was therefore constitutionally suspect]. Here, by contrast, [the cause of action based on
breach of confidence] simply requires those making promises to
keep them. The parties themselves ... determine the scope of
their legal obligations and any restrictions which may be placed on
the publication of truthful information are self-imposed. 199
196

FloridaStar,491 U.S. at 534, 538 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,496 (1974)); see also id. at 544 (White,
J., dissenting) ("Cox Broadcastingstands for the proposition that the State cannot make
the press its first line of defense in withholding private information from the publicit cannot ask the press to secrete private facts that the State makes no effort to
safeguard in the first place."); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S.
829, 837 n.10 (1978) (declining to address the issue of whether a state could punish
judicial review commission staff members who breached confidentiality and disclosed
information to the press); Cox BroadcastingCorp., 420 U.S. at 496 ("If there are privacy
interests to be protected in judicial proceedings, the States must respond by means
which avoid public documentation or other exposure of private information.").
197 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
198 See id. at 2519.
199 Id. Even some of the dissenters in Cohen were open to the idea of enforceable
obligations of confidentiality, albeit not for purposes of protecting a political figure
like the Cohen petitioner:
This is not to say that the breach of such a promise of confidentiality could
never give rise to liability. One can conceive of situations in which the
injured party is a private individual, whose identity is of less public concern
than that of the petitioner; liability there might not be constitutionally
prohibited.
Id. at 2523 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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In the twilight of the private-facts tort, the Court seems to be
suggesting and sanctioning a new approach to the protection of
2 °°
privacy interests: "self-imposing" duties of confidentiality.
Following the Court's lead, this Comment advocates the
interment of the common law private-facts tort, 20 1 and the adoption of a new approach to privacy protection, the proposed breach
of confidence tort. The rest of this Comment will explore the
possibility of protecting privacy through a breach of confidence tort.
This section will set forth and analyze the elements and exceptions
to the proposed tort. Consideration of its constitutional implications will be delayed until Part IV.
A. The Elements of the ProposedBreach of Confidence Tort
It is proposed that a legally enforceable duty of confidentiality
should attach whenever a person or institution intentionally or
negligently engages in an unauthorized disclosure of inaccessible,
personal information that she/it has explicitly and voluntarily
agreed to hold in confidence, and this disclosure results in the
publicity of that information. 20 2 The proposed exceptions to the
2

For a further discussion of Cohen, see infra notes 321-347 and accompanying

text.
201 It should be noted that an interment of the common law private-facts tort
would have no effect on the Supreme Court's requirement that publishers of truthful

information not be held liable unless that information was unlawfully obtained. What
is meant to be interred is the common law approach set out in the Restatement, which

requires the court to balance "offensiveness" and "newsworthiness." See supra notes
106-143 and accompanying text. The "lawfully obtained" doctrine, on the other hand,
is a constitutional minimum, and cannot be abandoned. Since the proposed breach
of confidence tort focuses liability on information's source rather than its publisher,
it is unlikely to conflict with the Court's "lawfully obtained" standard.
2 The specific formulation of the breach of 'confidence tort is obviously
debatable; its suggested form merely reflects the author's attempt to balance the
interests favoring enforcement of confidentiality against the countervailing interests
of freedom of speech and press, concern for public safety, and consideration of the
human propensity to gossip. While justifications will be advanced here for the
proposed formulation of the tort, some of the choices made in defining its elements
are, admittedly, arguable. Regardless of one's objections to the proposed tort's
formulation, however, the underlying argument of this Comment-that the demise of
the private-facts tort demands the exploration of new approaches to protecting
privacy interests-still holds. The author advances the formulation of the tort with a
desire less to set precise boundaries than to stir debate on the issue. See Vickery,
supra note 35, at 1451 ("Explicit recognition of the new [breach of confidence] tort
would have the... advantage of making possible open debate about the tort's proper
scope."). Therefore, although some readers may object to certain elements of the
proposed tort, they are encouraged not to "throw out the baby with the bath water."
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duty of confidence created by this tort will be delineated in the next
sub-section; 20 3 this sub-section will explore the scope of the tort's
prima facie case.
1. Scope of the Duty of Confidentiality
The proposed tort would only create a duty of confidentiality if
the confider has indicated, either in writing or orally, a desire to
exercise control over the disclosure of the information, and the
confidant has "explicitly and voluntarily agreed to hold [the
information] in confidence." 2°4 This requirement could be satisSee infra notes 270-294 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 202. Whether or not there is currently a
requirement of "agreement" in British law is not clear from the cases. See LAW
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 63,1 4.1-.5. The Law Commission Report, however,
suggests the codification of such a requirement:
an obligation of confidence should come into existence where the recipient
of the information has expressly given an undertaking to the giver of the
information to keep confidential that information ... or where such an
undertaking is, in the absence of any indication to the contrary on the part
of the recipient, to be inferred from the relationship between the giver and
the recipient or from the latter's conduct.
Id. 1 6.14(i). The scope of the duty of confidence advocated by the Law Commission
is, therefore, much broader than that suggested here. First, in British case law, a duty
of confidentiality can be "inferred from the relationship between the giver and the
recipient." Id. In general, duties of confidence arise irrespective of any "agreement"
when "the circumstances of the relationship import it[,] which is a matter to be
determined by the court in each case." Id. 1 4.2. This inference has created
obligations of confidence, irrespective of the presence of a contract, in business and
professional relationships. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
While the breach of confidence tort has seen a recent emergence in similar
relationships in U.S. law, see supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text, the proposed
tort would create a separate, more limited body of law protecting confidences
disclosed in any relationship. To the extent that professional confidences could also
be protected by a wider duty of confidence (i.e., one which does not require an
"acceptance" of the obligation of confidentiality and would not require that the
disclosure results in "publicity," see infra notes 205-240, 258-269 and accompanying
text)justified by the societal interest in protecting the special benefits which inure
from those relationships, it would not conflict with the proposed cause ofaction. For
example, a doctor could be obligated by a duty of confidence arising out of either 1)
a patient's request for confidentiality (accompanied by the doctor's acceptance) or 2)
a general duty of confidentiality implicit in the relationship.
An extension of the "inferential duty of confidence" concept to all personal
relationships would result in tremendous practical and constitutional difficulties,
however. Practically speaking, asking courts to discern which private relationships are
"special" enough tojustify an inference of a duty of confidentiality would result in the
same vague and subjective line-drawing that smothered the private-facts tort. As for
constitutional problems, the Supreme Court has thus far held that enforceable duties
of confidentiality may arise only when the confidant's waiver of her right to speak is
203
204
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fied either by a written agreement of confidentiality or the confidant responding "yes" to the confider's question "will you hold what
20 5
I am about to tell you in confidence?"
The requirement that the potential confidant "accept" the
potential confider's request of confidentiality2 °6 would ensure the
"voluntary" and "explicit." See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
The proposed "agreement"-oriented approach, however, has neither of these
problems: provided that the confidant agrees to hold the information in confidence,
no "special," pre-existing relationship need exist for a duty of confidentiality to arise;
moreover, an explicit agreement by the confidant is required. Unlike the "inferential
duty" approach, under the proposed formulation of the tort complete strangers could
be bound by a duty of confidence, its legal enforceability depending completely on
the way the confidential information was divulged between the parties.
The proposed tort also rejects the British rule allowing a duty of confidentiality
to be "inferred from the [confidant's]... conduct." See LAW COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 63, 1 6.14(i). Waiver of the important constitutional right at stake-the
confidant's right to speak-should not be allowed without an explicit agreement. See
infra note 305 and accompanying text; see also Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696
P.2d 527,534 (Or. 1985) ("[A] legal duty not to speak, unless voluntarily assumed in
entering the relationship, will not be imposed by courts or jurors in the name of
custom or reasonable expectations."). The desire to provide potential tortfeasors with
notice as to the boundaries of tortious conduct, see infranote 207 and accompanying
text, would also be hampered by such an approach.
205 The exact language of each oral agreement will of course change. The
important point is that in each case the potential confidant must affirm the confider's
explicit request for confidentiality. Whether the agreement is oral or written will
most likely depend on the degree of trust between the confider and confidant and the
potential for public disclosure of the information. While written agreements of
confidentiality between 'friends" would be impractical and perhaps result in ill will,
they may be useful in situations where the confidant is a stranger, or an institution
(e.g., a government agency). In such a case, the benefits of a written agreement (e.g.,
improved evidentiary position in the event of publicity of the information), may
outweigh the loss of trust and goodwill that a demand for a written agreement may
invoke. It should also be noted that individuals at greater risk of public exposure,
public figures, for example, may feel the need to have even intimate acquaintances

sign an agreement of confidentiality. See infra note 240.
2
' Since the proposed tort is based on an explicit contractual relationship, the
question arises as to why it should be recognized as a tort. There are five main
reasons why contract remedies alone would be inadequate. First, contractual
relationships require consideration. It is difficult to imagine what the confidant is
offering in consideration for the confidence revealed. But see Katz, supra note 1, at
844 n.147 ("Conceivably, friends could agree at the outset of their relationship that
anything said in confidence between them would not be publicly disclosed. In that
case, the mutual exchange of promises might, though will not necessarily, satisfy the
requirement of consideration."). British common law overcomes this problem by
permitting enforceable duties of confidence to arise without consideration. SeeJames

Michael, Breach of Confidence, 131 NEW LJ. 1201 (1981).
Second, since many confidentiality agreements will be oral, it is possible that they
would be obstructed by the statute of frauds. In many states a statute of frauds

provision works to make void any oral contract which cannot be performed within
one year. See A. MUELLER ET AL., CONTRAGT LAW AND ITS APPLICATIONS 224 (3d ed.
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1983). Since a duty of confidence is an ongoing obligation that would often last
longer than a year, they would probably need to be in writing if they were to be
enforced in contract. The impracticality of demanding a written agreement for any
duty of confidentiality to last beyond a year is apparent. See supra note 205.
Third, contract law is also deficient because damages for mental distress-the
damages which would most typically result from breach of confidence-are as a rule
not allowed.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 cmt. a (1981).

Supposedly, courts will make an exception when "the contract or the breach is of such
a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result." Id. In
practice, however, this exception has been very narrowly construed (although its
invocation with regard to leaky caskets is quite frequent). See, e.g., Hirst v. Elgin
Metal Casket Co., 438 F. Supp. 906, 908 (D. Mont. 1977) (emotional damages
awarded when undertaker's "leakproof" casket leaked); Lamm v. Shingleton, 55 S.E.2d
810, 813 (N.C. 1949) (emotional damages awarded when undertaker's "watertight"
vault leaked). Tort law, on the other hand, presents no such limitations. It would
compensate the confider for any injuries sustained as a result of the confidant's
breach of duty of confidence, restricted only by the doctrine of "proximate cause."
See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 19, at 612-23.

Fourth, courts have been sporadic in their enforcement of contractual duties in
familial and social relationships. See, e.g., Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2 K.B. 571, 579
(Eng. C.A.) (holding unenforceable a husband's promise to his wife to provide a
monthly allowance because "[i]n respect of [such] promises each house is a domain
into which the King's writ does not run, and to which his officers do not seek to be
admitted"); Mitzel v. Hauck, 105 N.W.2d 378, 380 (S.D. 1960) ("To spell out a
contract [for use of a car] from this hunting trip of these young men, an enjoyable
pastime with his friends as plaintiff described it, 'would transcend reality' .... ")
(quoting Scotvold v. Scotvold, 298 N.W. 266, 272 (S.D. 1941)); O'Reilly v. Mitchel,
148 N.Y.S. 88 (Sup. Ct. 1914) (rejecting claim that a politician is contractually liable
for not fulfilling campaign promises). To the extent that agreements of confidentiality would often be exchanged in the "social" or "familial" context, the proposed tort
would not be redundant with contract law in that courts might not enforce the
contract. Even if recognition of the tort resulted in some redundancy, overlap has
previously been allowed in the common law for particularly egregious breaches. See,
e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 179 (Cal. 1967) (holding that insurance
company's refusal to settle was actionable in both tort and contract); Chung v.
Kaonohi Ctr. Co., 618 P.2d 283, 289 (Haw. 1980) (holding that shopping mall's denial
of lease to fast food restaurant sounded in both tort and contract); see also LAW
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 63, 6.128 ("[T]here seems to us to be no reason
why [a tortious] obligation of confidence should not come into being even though the
undertaking of confidence has contractual force.... [A]s elsewhere in the common
law, [there would] be a co-existence of remedies in contract and tort.").
Finally, the diverse privacy and First Amendment interests at stake in this area
arc probably best accommodated within a tort framework, where the multi-faceted
elements upon which they should be balanced can be clearly defined. Relying solely
on the fairly rigid contract principles of offer, acceptance, consideration, and breach

would overly simplify the complex problems presented. In support of this point, one
commentator noted that
liability [for breach of confidence] should be grounded in tort law.... [A]
separate tort focused directly on the broken confidence should be
recognized because it would address squarely the individual and societal
interests at stake in a confidential relationship. With such a tort available,
courts confronted with a compelling case of breach of confidence will not
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fundamental goal of any tort: that the tortfeasor is given notice of
the potential for tortious conduct. 20 7 As one commentator put
it: "[t]he contractual duty of confidentiality puts both parties on
notice of the communications to be protected and the rights and
responsibilities that the relationship creates." 2 8 In addition, this
provision would avoid placing the burden of confidentialityfundamentally a waiver of the confidant's First Amendment right to
speak 2M-on an involuntary confidant.2 1 0 Since the obligation
of confidentiality proposed here includes a general duty of care to
protect the privacy of the confidential information, 21 this point
should not be underestimated. The tort requires the confidant not
only not to disclose the information, but also to protect it from
disclosure. The potential restriction on the confidant's activities
be left to manipulate haphazardly the remedies offered by theories of
liability developed for other wrongs.
Vickery, supra note 35, at 1451.
207 See Bezanson, supra note 87, at 67 ("Tort liability must, if nothing else, be
realistically premised on the conviction that the tort feasor will be put on notice of
the tortious conduct."). The related question of whether this "agreement" of
confidentiality must precede the disclosure of the information by the confider is an
interesting one. It would seem that an agreement of confidentiality made after the
information is released would be equally as binding as one made prior to the release.
The potential confidant in the former situation would not, however, be obligated to
accept the duty at that time. A confider who waits to get such assurances, therefore,
puts the confidentiality of the information at risk. This would seem an equitable
result: the duty of confidentiality does not exist until the confidant has agreed to
treat the information as confidential. Before such an agreement exists, however, the
burden of confidentiality should rest only on the confider. See LAW COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 63,1 6.13 ("We propose that the person who acquires information and undertakes to keep it confidential should be under an obligation to do so
whether he gave the undertaking before or after or at the time when he acquired the
information.").
208 Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 363. Professor Zimmerman makes this
statement in a general discussion advocating the legal recognition of "special
confidential relationships." See id. Though it is not entirely dear, Professor
Zimmerman seems to be referring to professional or fiduciary relationships. See id.
at 363-64 (discussing, but not explicitly limiting, the usefulness of "rights of
contractual confidentiality... [i]n the context of private commercial and professional
services"). Regardless of its context, however, the statement holds true for all explicit
agreements of confidentiality, even those in private relations.
209 See infra notes 295-297 and accompanying text.
210 The Supreme Court also agrees on this point. See Snepp v. United States, 444
U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (per curiam) (rejecting a confidant's First Amendment
defense to a confidentiality agreement, emphasizing that the agreement was "express"
and "voluntary").
211 See infra notes 256-257 and accompanying text.
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that such an obligation imposes should not be thrust upon an
21 2
individual unwillingly.
The proposed tort would, therefore, protect information whose
213
transfer has been localized into a small number of confidants
who have been explicitly obligated to a duty of confidentiality.
Provided the other elements of the tort are satisfied, a confidant
who breaches this duty by intentionally publicizing the information
(or was negligent in allowing it to be publicized) will be liable to the
confider for any injuries suffered from the publicity. For example,
had the rape victim in Florida Star v. BJ.F.214 obtained an agreement from the police department that her identity be kept confidential, she would have had a cause of action against it for negligently
2 15
disclosing that information to the press.
Furthermore, because the proposed duty of confidentiality
attaches only if an individual is bound by an explicit agreement, no
obligation of confidentiality will attach to third parties who receive
information subject to an obligation of confidence, but who have
not explicitly assumed this obligation themselves. That is, an
individual not a party to a confidential relationship could not be
held liable for revealing information even if it is inherently private
or she knows it is confidential.2 1 6 Although British case law holds
912 The Law Commission agreed with this proviso, concluding that:
provided the defendant would be liable if he had himself disclosed the
information... he should be equally liable if the disclosure or use results
from his negligence. The proviso is important so as to make clear that a
person does not have a duty of reasonable care thrust upon him in respect
of the handling of unsolicited information.
LAW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 63, 1 6.57.
213 For an exploration of proof problems presented by multiple sources, see infra
note 234.
214 491 U.S. 524 (1989). For a more complete explanation of the facts of this case,
see supra notes 154-156 and accompanying text.
21-1 It is not dear from the facts in FloridaStar whether the rape victim made any
request of confidentiality from the State. In fact, she may have. The opinion's failure
to discuss this point merely highlights the differences between the breach of
confidence and invasion of privacy approaches to privacy protection. The proposed
tort offers a remedy only to those individuals who have taken positive steps (i.e.,
entering into a confidentiality agreement) to protect their privacy. Failure to do so
is dispositive. In invasion of privacyjurisprudence, however, the manner in which the
information is divulged is not important. The Court's failure to discuss the
circumstances under which the information was divulged is therefore not surprising.
It is, in any event, unrealistic to apply the proposed tort to the facts of privacy
cases. After all, the facts may have been different if a breach of confidence cause of
action were recognized in the plaintiff'sjurisdiction. For example, had the proposed
tort been available to the rape victim in Florida Star, she probably would have
requested confidentiality.
216 If, however, the third party has received the information as a result of a
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third parties liable for revealing information that they know or
should know is subject to an obligation of confidence, 2 17 this
practice would not be constitutionally acceptable in this country. As
will be demonstrated in Part IV, it is only through an explicit waiver
that individuals relinquish their First Amendment rights to speak
2 18
and publish truthful information.
This "third-party" exception to the proposed duty of confidentiality will essentially create a newsperson's privilege. Members of the
press will be able to print with impunity any information which they
have not agreed to keep confidential. 219 Although it could be
argued that a reporter who knowingly makes a source reveal
information bound by a duty of confidence has unlawfully acquired
information, to hold ajournalist liable depending upon her "knowledge" of the confidentiality of the information received from a
source would have an impermissible chilling effect upon the
publication of legitimate news. 22° Just as the First Amendment
confidant's disclosure, and the third party publicizes the information, the confider
may be able to hold the confidant liable for the disclosure. See infra notes 258-269
and accompanying text.
217 See, e.g., Duchess of Argyll v. Duke of Argyll, [1965] 2 W.L.R. 789 (Eng. Ch.
1964) (holding that a newspaper which receives from a confidant information it
knows to be confidential is liable to the confider). See generally LAW COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 63, 1 4.11-.12 (reviewing British case law on this point).
The Supreme Court in FloridaStar might also have been indicating its openness
to this possibility when it asserted that "[t]o the extent sensitive information rests in
private hands, the government may under some circumstances forbid its nonconsensual acquisition." 491 U.S. at 534. This assertion could be interpreted to
mean that if the information is derived from a private (rather than public) source,
then the balance between press and privacy interests would be struck differently, that
is, liability would be extended to the press if they acquired private information
through "non-consensual acquisition." Because the Court did not give any indication
of what it meant by "non-consensual acquisition" or "some circumstances," it is
uncertain whether a source breaching a duty of confidentiality would fall within this
"non-consensual acquisition" category. But see Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) (holding that a newspaper could publish
information about the proceedings of the statejudicial review commission despite a
criminal
statute barring disclosure of such information).
2
18 See infra notes 304-305 and accompanying text.
219 The possibility that a member of the press could be held liable for breaching
her own agreement of confidentiality with a confider was recently answered by the
Supreme Court in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991). In that case,
the Court held that twojournalists could be held liable for breach of a confidentiality
agreement with a source. See id. at 2516. Calling the decision's detrimental effects
on First Amendment rights "constitutionally insignificant," the Court held that the
First Amendment does not confer on the press a constitutional right to disregard
promises that would otherwise be enforced under state law. See id. at 2519. See infra
notes 321-347 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
2o See Hill, supra note 87, at 1279 ("A person supplying information to a
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forbids burdening the press with determining the "newsworthiness"
or "offensiveness" 21 of information, it would also prohibit requiring the press to determine whether information is subject to a duty
22 2
of confidence.
Still, one can argue that the scope of the duty of confidentiality
defined by the proposed tort's "agreement" standard would result
in only very limited protection of information that individuals would
like to keep private; individuals may want to keep private a
significant amount of information that would not lend itself to an
agreement of confidentiality. For example, under the proposed tort
it would not be possible to hold confidential embarrassing public
activities that are witnessed by too many people for the individual
to bind in confidence or by only one person that the individual does

newspaper may have obtained such information through a variety of [tortious] ways
....Yet it is unthinkable that a newspaper should incur liability solely because it has
knowledge that the information is 'tainted' because so derived.").
The court in Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969), was also in accord
on this point. In that case, the court refused to extend an invasion of privacy claim
to members of the press who had received and published documents that they knew
"had been removed without authorization." Id. at 705. The court asserted that a
member of the press
approached by an eavesdropper with an offer to share in the information
gathered through the eavesdropping would perhaps play the nobler part
should he spurn the offer and shut his ears. However, it seems to us that
at this point it would place too great a strain on human weakness to hold
one liable in damage who merely succumbs to temptation and listens.
Id. The court would have been truer to the facts of the case had it extended its
language to include not only "listening" but also "publishing" the information. Still,
the court's point is clear: third-party liability for the press based on knowledge that
the information was confidential is impermissible.
221 See supra notes 125-131 and accompanying text.
22 Imposing third-party liability on the press would also destroy the delicate
"adversarial game" balance of the breach of confidence tort. See infra notes 385-392
and accompanying text for a discussion of this "adversarial game." As Professor Bickel
remarked:
[A]s I conceive the contest established by the First Amendment, ...the
presumptive duty of the press is to publish, not to guard security or to be
concerned with the morals of its sources. Those responsibilities rest chiefly
elsewhere. Within self-disciplined limits and presumptively, the press is a
morally neutral, even an unconcerned, agent as regards the provenance of
newsworthy material that comes to hand; and within like limits and again
presumptively, the press is not the judge or the definer of the national
interest. It is, rather, one party to a contest. Its chief responsibility is to
play its role in that contest, for it is the contest that serves the public
interest, which is not wholly identified either with the interest of the
government of the day, or of the press.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MoRALrry OF CONSENT 81 (1975).
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not know was a witness. Additionally, many individuals would forgo
the protection offered by the tort simply because they do not wish
to "contractualize" their private relations, 223 thereby leaving all
private information that they have shared with intimates exposed to
the possibility of publicity. Finally, the tort's remedy is necessarily
dependent on there being a human source of the information that
can agree to the obligation of confidentiality. Therefore, the tort
potentially would not cover printed information and computer data
bases. 224 Although these are only three of the possible limitations
225
on the scope of the protection offered by the proposed tort,
they cut a wide swath. Indeed, the proposed tort would provide
only limited protection of information, much less than that of the
private-facts tort, private facts being more numerous than confiden226
tial ones.
The critique that the proposed tort's scope is confined, while
obviously accurate, misses the point, however. A duty of confidentiality is essentially a duty not to speak. In light of the tort's potential
infringement of First Amendment rights, 227 it is the limit of the
tort's obligation which is its strength. The requirement of "agreement" and the limitations it imposes on who and what can be bound
by a duty of confidence is necessary in order to overcome these
First Amendment concerns. 228 Although the broader notion of
223 See infra notes 236-240 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue.
224 There is, of course, the possibility that an individual could get an agreement
of confidentiality from the "caretakers" of these information sources. However, the
combination of the individual's ignorance of who has this information, the large

number of data collection agencies that share it, and their probable resistance to
confidentiality agreements with respect to information already in their possession,
would probably make any attempt to control the dissemination of this information
with the proposed tort futile.
225 For other limitations on the proposed tort's scope, see infra notes 378-384 and
accompanying text.

226 Private facts, the information protected by the private-facts tort, encompass a
very wide amount of information. The Restatement includes as examples: "[s]exual
relations, .. . family quarrels, many unpleasant or disgraceful or humiliating illnesses,
most intimate personal letters, most details of a man's life in his home, and some of
his past history that he would rather forget."

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,

supranote 18, § 652D cmt. b. Because these details of a person's life are "inherently"
private they could potentially be protected by the private-facts tort; whether the
proposed breach of confidence tort would protect them would depend on whether
the information was divulged subject to an agreement of confidentiality.
17 For a detailed explanation of the First Amendment challenges to the proposed
breach of confidence tort, see infra notes 295-392 and accompanying text.
228 For an exploration of the "agreement" requirement's interrelation with
freedom of speech and press, see infra notes 298-348 and accompanying text.
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privacy underlying the private-facts tort may potentially protect a
wider scope of information, this statement ignores the fact that a
right, no matter how broadly defined in theory, is worth nothing if
it is not enforced. 2 29 As one commentator remarked: "[if breach
of confidentiality] succeeds in more closely safeguarding privacy by
rules that might actually be enforced, it will fulfill a promise that the
2 °
present [private-facts] ... tort consistently disappoints." 3
Beyond the constitutional justification for the tort's limited
scope, the question arises as to why a society, which values privacy,
should be satisfied with such limited privacy protection. The answer
to this inquiry can be found in the notion of personal responsibility
for private facts on which the proposed breach of confidence tort
rests. While breach of confidence may be less protective of privacy
interests, it produces a more rational result, in that it puts the
burden of protecting those interests where it belongs-on the
individual. As one commentator remarked, "[i]n order to preserve
confidentiality, a person must take reasonable care to keep the
information secret. If, for example, confidential documents are left
unattended in a public place or a person blurts out information in
public, he cannot insist on the recipient of that information keeping
it to himself."23 1 The breach of confidence tort will provide
protection only to those who most value it-those who will 1) go to
the pains of imposing the duty by entering into "agreements", 2) be
discrete in the number of people to which this confidence is
disclosed, and 3) avoid exposing intimate behavior to public
view. 23 2 The proposed tort is very different from the private-facts
tort, which burdens the media with the double duty of both
determining what information is private and protecting it.23 3 To
demand restraint when we have not shown any is too much to ask
of a media responding to the desires of a naturally curious public.
Placing the responsibility for keeping secrets on the individual and
not on the shoulders of the press or the rest of society seems a
more rational approach to privacy protection.
229 For an explanation of the impotency of the private-facts tort, see supra notes
106-72 and accompanying text.
230 Bezanson, supra note 87, at 8.
231 Thompson, supra note 62, at 8 (footnotes omitted).
232 See Henry P. Lundsgaarde, Privacy: An AnthropologicalPerspectiveon the Right
to Be Let Alone, 8 HoUs. L. REV. 858, 875 (1971) (questioning whether as many
invasions of privacy would be possible without the "active collaboration" of people
willing to disclose private facts).
23See

supra notes 118-124 and accompanying text.
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One could also object to basing the duty of confidentiality on
the existence of an "agreement" because of the difficulty of proving
the terms of what will often be a verbal contract. 234 In response,
it should first be asserted that while a scant amount of evidence as
to the agreement between the parties will obviously be a factor that
the courts will weigh in adjudicating breach of confidence claims,
this is an objection that only goes to the problems of proof, not to
the merits of having such a cause of action in the first place.
Additionally, in comparison to the subjective, value laden prima
facie case that confronts a private-facts plaintiff, the breach of
confidence proof problems seem positively concrete. Debate over
the more circumscribed questions of consent, intent, and conduct
of the parties will most probably prove more objective and equitable
than those encountered trying to prove "newsworthiness" and
"offensiveness." 23 5
A final possible objection to the scope of the duty of confidentiality imposed by the tort is that "contractualizing" private relationships-relationships which are supposed to be based on mutual trust
and respect-is undesirable. 23 6 A number of responses undercut
this critique, however. First, although switching from the invasion
of privacy to breach of confidence approach will admittedly require
members of society to change how they go about protecting their
234 See Vickery, supra note 35, at 1460 (asserting that a general "confessorconfidant" approach to breach of confidence would raise a "potentially difficult
evidentiary determination of whether a confidential relationship existed at all,
whether the information was learned within it or independently, and whether or not
there was consent").
A similar proof problem will confront a confider who has disclosed the
information in question to a number of different confidants and does not know which
was the source of the publicity. On the other hand, the extent of this problem is
within the confider's control. Since both the likelihood of breach and the difficulty
of prosecuting a claim will increase as the number of confidants increase (because the
more potential sources of the information there are, the more likely it is that the
individual confidant will feel able to disclose the information without being caught,
and the more difficult it will be for the confider to prove which confidant breached),
the responsibility of limiting the potential for publicity and the difficulty of proving
breach rests with the confider. Successful prosecution of the tort will depend on the
confider treating with discretion the information she wants kept private.
235 See Bezanson, supra note 87, at 71-72 (stating that a breach of confidence cause
of action would shift the focus of adjudication "from open-ended issues of value to
the more circumscribed questions of consent, waiver, and an obligation of
confidentiality owed by one possessing such information").
2M See Katz, supra note 1, at 844 ("People are naturally reluctant to transform
relationships otherwise based on mutual respect and trust into contractual
relationships.... ").
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privacy, such a change is worthwhile in that the proposed breach of
confidence tort will provide a measure of privacy protection where
the current private-facts tort provides none. Second, to the extent
that the fear underlying this complaint is that private "gossip" will
become legally actionable, it is unfounded.
The "publicity"
requirement of the proposed tort would ensure that liability would
not be imposed for discrete breaches of confidence that do not
result in public knowledge. 23 7 Third, despite the potentially
uncomfortable imposition of a contract to protect one's secrets,
similar unpleasant obstacles have been overcome in other areas of
law-most notably, antenuptial agreements commonly used to
protect property interests. 283 Finally, although the imposition of
a legally enforceable duty of confidentiality would result in some
loss of trust between confider and confidant,23 9 recognition of the
tort will not force such a sacrifice on anyone who does not want it.
Potential confidants can decline the invitation to confidence and
potential confiders can either not extend the invitation or extend it
and not enforce it. Furthermore, some individuals' desire to keep
information confidential may outweigh any countervailing deterioration in trust.240 Since weighing the interests at stake is inherently
subjective, the determination should be left to the individual.

237 For additional discussion of the "publicity" requirement, see infra notes 258269 and accompanying text.
2 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dawley, 551 P.2d 323, 325 (Cal. 1976) (upholding
an antenuptial agreement).
239 Note that British common law has held personal duties of confidence legally
cognizable for over two decades, without any corresponding breakdown in personal
relationships. See Duchess of Argyll v. Duke of Argyll, [1965] 2 W.L.R. 789, 797 (Eng.
Ch. 1964) (holding that a duty of confidence is implicit in the marital relationship and
thereby enjoining a wife from publishing her husband's secrets).
240 Two possibilities come to mind where the balance may be struck in favor of
confidentiality. First, many individuals who reveal confidential information to
government agencies or other institutions may want to take advantage of the tort
because the sacrifice of trust will not be painful in such instances. In addition, public
figures, who are more likely to be subject to invasions of privacy, may find it
beneficial to bind their intimates regardless of the loss of trust that may occur. See
Katz, supra note 1, at 844 ("While such precautionary contracts may prove to be
offensive initially-and perhaps even throughout a relationship-a party wishing to
safeguard his or her interests may have to sacrifice part of the goodwill of the
relationship in order to do so.").
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2. Inaccessible and Personal Information Requirements
The proposed tort stipulates that only "inaccessible, personal
information" can be bound by the tort's obligation of confidentiality.241
The "Personal" information requirement is meant to
distinguish the protection provided by the proposed tort from that
provided by the settled law of trade secrets and copyright. The
proposed tort is not meant to be an expansion of these areas of the
law; the former protects information that is significant to an
individual's identity or privacy, the latter protects business or
institutional secrets. 242 The requirement also reflects the belief
of the Court that corporations and institutions do not enjoy the
same level of protection of privacy and speech that individuals
do.2 43 The practical significance of the requirement is that
corporations, the government, and other institutional bodies will
not be able to use the tort to try and control the public disclosure
of organizational secrets. No liability will attach to institutional
whistleblowers, 244 though it would allow an organization to bind in
confidence a third party to whom the corporation discloses personal
information. For example, a credit agency revealing an individual's
credit history to a retailer may bind the retailer in confidence.
"Inaccessible" refers to any information that is confidential or
not already within the public knowledge. 245 Thus, on this ele241 See supra text accompanying note 202.

242 See supra note 65.
24S See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality
opinion). In dissent, Justice Rehnquist asserted what is probably now the majority
opinion:

[B]ecause the interest on which the constitutional protection of corporate
speech rests is the societal interest in receiving information and ideas, the
constitutional interest of a corporation in not permitting the presentation
of other distinct views clearly identified as those of the speaker is de
minimis .... This argument is bolstered by the fact that the two constitutional liberties most closely analogous to the right to refrain from speaking-the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and the constitutional right of
privacy-have been denied to corporations based on their corporate status.
Id. at 34 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
777,779 n.14 (1978) (asserting that "'purely personal' guarantees ... are unavailable
to corporations and other organizations" and declining to hold that "corporations

have the full measure of rights that individuals enjoy under the First Amendment").
24 These would include parties that reveal government misconduct, such as those
that disclosed the Watergate and Iran-Contra scandals.
245 Present English breach of confidence law agrees on this point: it does not
appear to provide protection against disclosure of information already in the public
domain, at least in cases where the duty of confidentiality arises in equity (that is,
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ment the tort shares a requirement that is similar to the private-facts
tort's "private facts" requirement.2

46

The transfer of this element

into the breach of confidence tort is a necessary response to First
Amendment interests. 247 Even if the confidant has waived his
right to speak, the First Amendment would not acknowledge such
a waiver if non-disclosure does not incur substantial benefit to the
confider.2 48 If the information is widely known, the confidant
holding this information in confidence would only marginally
benefit the confider-little harm can flow from further disclosure of
public information. Thus, the confidant in such a situation could
breach the duty of confidence with impunity.
The difficulty of defining "inaccessibility," however, might make
courts reluctant to enforce the proposed breach of confidence tort.
The uncertainty inherent in this element, and the potential for
where the duty has been inferred from the relationship). See LAW COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 63,1 4.15-.20. In addition, the Law Commission has recommended that any codification of England's breach of confidence law should include a
"public domain" exemption. See id. 1 6.74(i).
English common law, however, has held duties of confidence arising in contract
to lie outside the "public domain" exemption. See id. 1 4.21 ("fT]here is no doubt
that a contract can provide for information to be kept confidential... whether or not
that information is in or comes into the public domain."). Still, as another
commentator noted, "in practice, it is difficult to see how any meaning or effect could
be given to such an obligation by the courts. The confider could not establish a right
to damages for the confidant's use of something which was freely available to
everyone." GURRY, supra note 34, at 65; cf. LAW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 63,
1 6.74(i) ("To ... enjoy[] the protection of ... breach . . . of confidence, the
information must be information which is not in the 'public domain.'... [I]nformation is in the public domain when, having regard to its nature and the circumstances
of its disclosure, it is generally available to the public.").
246 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 18, § 652D cmt. b ("There
is no liability when the defendant merely gives further publicity to information about
the plaintiff that is already public.").
247 See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) ("[O]nce the
truthful information [is] 'publicly revealed' or 'in the public domain' the court could
not constitutionally restrain its dissemination.") (citing Oklahoma Publishing Co. v.
District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam)).
248 See United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1313, 1318 (4th Cir.) (stating in
dictum that "the First Amendment limits the extent to which the United States,
contractually or otherwise, may impose secrecy requirements upon its employees....
It precludes such restraints with respect to information which is unclassified or
officially disclosed ....
Information, though classified, may have been publicly
disclosed. If it has been, [the defendant] should have as much right as anyone else
to republish it"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972); see also Snepp v. United States, 444
US 507, 521 n.1l (1980) (per curiam) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "[i]t is
noteworthy that the Court does not disagree with the Fourth Circuit's view in
Marchetti... that a CIA employee [who has signed a confidentiality agreement] has
a First Amendment right to publish unclassified information").
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chilling the confidant's freedom of speech, 24 9 could create an
incentive for courts to contract the "inaccessibility" element to the
point where it undermines the proposed breach of confidence tort,
much like the "newsworthiness" defense has emasculated the
private-facts tort.250 Determining when information has entered
the public domain, however, constitutes a more objective inquiry
than distinguishing between "newsworthiness" and "offensiveness."
In time, quantifiable lines may be drawn around which both
confider and confidant can order their actions, thereby minimizing
the potential chilling effect on protected (i.e. in this case "accessible") speech. In addition, the situation presented by the breach of
confidence tort is also conceptually different from that presented by
the private-facts tort. A confider would presumably have some
control over the information entering the public domain in the first
place; 25 1 the private-facts plaintiff, on the other hand, has no such
control over whether or not a fact is "newsworthy." The outcome
of whether or not information is "accessible" is, therefore, at least
partially in the hands of the confider.
In addition, the "inaccessibility" requirement presents the
potential problem of a confidant using her knowledge of the
confidences disclosed to her as a guide to public sources of the
information, thereby justifying an exemption from her duty of
confidentiality. British courts that have struggled with this "bad
faith confidant" problem have developed a test of "inaccessibility"
that pivots on whether the information can "only be reproduced at
the cost of time, labour, and effort." 252 If adopted, this test
would help distinguish between information that is easily accessible,
and therefore privileged, and information which the confidant went
searching for in an effort to create a privilege for herself.

249
25

See infra notes 298-348 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 125-131 and accompanying text.

251 See supra notes 231-233 and accompanying text.
252 GURRY, supra note 34, at 71. The Law Commission Report phrases the test as
follows: "Information should not be treated as being in the public domain where it
is only accessible to the public after a significant contribution of labour, skill or
money has been made." LAw COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 63, 1 6.74(ii).
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3. Unauthorized Injurious Disclosure and Duty of Care
The proposed tort requires the confidant's disclosure to be
"unauthorized," "injurious," and made either "intentionally or
negligently." 253 The "unauthorized" requirement allows for the
possibility that the confider may wish to waive the confidant's duty
of confidentiality with regard to certain people and situations. By
allowing such authorization, this element ensures that the confidant's waiver of her right to speak is no broader than necessary.
Due to the necessity of clearly delineating the boundaries of tortious
conduct, however, only an explicit exemption from confidentiality
will qualify as a defense. 254 If the confider does not make a
careful delineation of her expectations regarding how the information can be used, the default should be in her favor: that is, any
disclosure should be considered "unauthorized."
The requirement of "injurious" disclosure is also unproblematic.
It fulfills the general requirement of tort law that detriment to the
plaintiff, in this case the confider, be substantiated before a cause
of action is established. In keeping with fundamental tort principles, the confidant would compensate the confider for any injuries
that were sustained as a result of her breach of duty of confidence,
2 55
restricted only by the doctrine of "proximate cause."
The prohibition of a "negligent" breach would impose a duty of
care concerning the information that the confidant agrees to hold
in confidence. The confidant would have a duty not only not to
publicize the information, but also to ensure that the information
is protected from inadvertent disclosure. The necessity of this
requirement is clear: if only intentional breaches of the duty of
confidence were actionable, then it would be rather easy for a
mischievous confidant to "accidently" leave confidential information
where the media could find it. Though English case law on this
point is not clear, 256 the Law Commission has suggested that a
253 See supra text accompanying note 202.
254 See GuRRY, supra note 34, at 5 (saying with regard to the general rule of

"disclosure" in English breach of confidence that "[t]his requirement is satisfied when
it is shown that the confidant has made an unauthorized use of the information by
usin&it for a purpose other than that for which it was imparted to him").
5
See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 19, at 272-80.
256 See LAw COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 63, 1 4.14 (finding no clear answer
in English common law to the question of "whether a person who is under a duty of
confidence, but is not in any contractual relationship with the person to whom it is
owed, can be liable for breach of confidence if the information to which the duty
relates is disclosed or used owing to his negligence"). British law does hold the
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duty of care be incorporated into any
future codification of the
257
breach of confidence cause of action.
4. The "Publicity" Requirement
This discussion of the proposed tort ends with a delineation of
potentially its most difficult element: the requirement that the
"disclosure results in the publicity 258 of the information held in
confidence. 259 This requirement, in addition to the "agreement"
requirement, 260 is an attempt to accommodate the natural human
propensity to gossip by exempting from liability isolated, discrete
breaches of confidence. As one court stated, "[a] cause of action
can not [sic] lie each time someone succumbs to the temptation to
break a confidence and whisper a juicy rumor." 26 1 The rationale
behind this distinction is perhaps more practical than princiconfidant liable for negligent breach if she is bound by a contractual duty of
confidence. See Weld-Bundell v. Stephens, 1920 App. Cas. 95 (appeal taken from
Eng.) (holding accountant liable for breach of duty of confidence when he negligently
left 2his
confidential papers with a client).
57 See LAW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 63, 1 6.59(i) (recommending that "a
person who is under [a duty of confidence] ... should also be under a duty to take
reasonable care to ensure that unauthorized disclosure or use does not take place").
m See supra text accompanying note 202. The Restatement's definition of
"publicity" as the disclosure of the confidential information to "so many persons that
the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of the public
knowledge," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 18, § 652D cmt. a, would
seem adequate here. Any disclosure in an instrument of mass media would fulfill the
"publicity" requirement.
Though this element is one that the proposed tort shares with the private-facts
tort, the "publicity" requirement in the breach of confidence tort does not focus
liability on the press; it focuses liability on the confidant/source of the information.
Its use in the proposed tort is not as constitutionally problematic in that it focuses
liability on an individual who has waived her First Amendment rights. See supra notes
298-348 and accompanying text.
2 English common law does not attach any requirement of "publicity" to the
disclosure of confidential information. Any disclosure, even to a single friend, is
potentially actionable. Such a formulation of the tort is of course possible only in a
country that does not have a First Amendment.
260 In addition to the publicity requirement, the "agreement" requirement, see
supra notes 204-240 and accompanying text, would also alleviate the tort's conflict
with First Amendment interests by distinguishing the class of confidential information
from casual communications. Furthermore, it would put the confidant on notice of
what information is and is not covered, alleviating any tendency to chill protected
speech. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
261 Blair v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 6, 324 N.Y.S.2d 222, 228 (Dist. Ct. 1971);
See also Vickery, supra note 35, at 1458 ("Human weakness... cannot in every case
be remedied by bringing the force of the state'sjudicial machinery to bear upon the
idle gossiper.").
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pled; 262 subjecting "back-fence" gossip to liability would "create
an impossible legal tangle." 263 In addition, holding individuals
liable for isolated, discrete breaches of confidence would constitute
a very heavy, and potentially unconstitutional state intrusion into
private affairs. The publicity requirement would ensure that the
imposition of liability would be limited to only egregious breaches:
disclosures that result in the confidential information becoming
public knowledge. Admittedly, the line drawn here is not as fixed
as that created by the other elements of the tort in that "publicity"
is difficult to clearly define. The potential for constitutional and
262 The line drawn by this requirement stands to leave some very sympathetic
plaintiffs without a remedy. One can imagine situations where the greatest harm
could result from the disclosure of a confidence to just one other person. See, e.g.,
Nagy v. Bell Tel. Co., 436 A.2d 701 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (private-facts case holding
that telephone company's disclosure of plaintiff's telephone number to her estranged
and abusive husband did not constitute publicity). In addition, as Professor
Zimmerman puts it, "[i]t is not at all clear that the exposure of personal information
to people who have no particular interest in the plaintiff's life is more damaging than
circulation to those who do know the plaintiff and who have a personal stake in
discovering whatever they can." Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 339.
Based on similar reasoning, the Michigan Supreme Court in Beaumont v. Brown,
257 N.W.2d 522 (Mich. 1977) advocated an erosion of the private-facts tort's
"publicity" requirement:
Communication of embarrassing facts about an individual to a public not
concerned with that individual and with whom the individual is not
concerned obviously is not a "serious interference" with plaintiff's right to
privacy.... An invasion of a plaintiff's right to privacy is important if it
exposes private facts to a public whose knowledge of those facts would be
embarrassing to the plaintiff. Such a public might be the general public, if
the person were a public figure, or a particular public such as fellow employees, club members, church members, family, or neighbors, if the person
were not a public figure.
Id. at 531 (cited in Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 339 n.258). The fact that the
information was disclosed in breach of confidence would also militate for the
availability of a cause of action; unlike in the private-facts cases, in the breach of
confidence situation the confidant is not only disclosing information that is
presumptively private, but she is also breaching a confidence to do it.
Still, from the author's point of view, a rule which runs opposite to basic human
nature and community mores and tries to control evey discrete breach of confidence
would seem as unlikely to be respected by society as the Eighteenth Amendment. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1 (prohibiting the "manufacture, sale, or transportation
of intoxicating liquors within.., the United States"), repealedby U.S. CONST. amend.
XXI, § 1; see also BLOUSTEIN, supra note 137, at 20 (arguing for the private-facts
publicity requirement by asserting that an individual's "human dignity," which the
private-facts tort was created to protect, is not harmed when friends change their
opinion of us, but only when we are "made a public spectacle"); infra note 373
(discussing the constitutionality of the "publicity" requirement).
263 Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 337.
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practical difficulties if the tort did not have the publicity element, 264 however, argues strongly in favor of its existence.
An important question needs to be raised at this point as to
what the confidant's mens rea should be as to the "publicity"
requirement for liability to attach: must the confidant intend that
her disclosure results in publicity, or should liability incur regardless
of her intent if the disclosure does indeed result in "publicity"? The
line drawn here is probably the most difficult one the proposed tort
presents. While requiring intent as to the publicity would seem to
be the more constitutionally permissible approach,26 5 it would
effectively obliterate the stricter requirement of negligence as to the
disclosure itself.266 It would be difficult, indeed, for the confidant to both negligently disclose information and intend for it be
publicized. Because the negligence standard as to the disclosure
ensures the good faith of the confidant, 26 7 denying the confidant
scienter as to the publicity prong seems necessary.
It must be kept in mind, however, that the purpose of the tort
is to reach an equitable accommodation of the privacy and First
Amendment interests that are in conflict. 2 68 The tort strives to
accomplish this goal by subjecting the source, rather than the
publisher of confidential information to liability. It is not attempting, however, to regulate isolated, private occasions of gossip.
Therefore, to the extent that a confidant did not actually mean for
her discrete disclosure to result in publicity of the confidential
information, imposition of liability would not seem to satisfy the
underlying aim of the tort, and would potentially chill personal
relations that it does not mean to disturb. In addition, it does not
seem equitable for the confidant to bear alone the burden that a
friend to whom she has discretely disclosed the confidential
information will publicize it when the confidant does not herself
intend publicity of the information; given the natural human
propensity to gossip, the confider must also be seen as assuming
some of the risk that the confidant's isolated disclosure to an
associate could result in unintended publication.
264 See supra notes 260-263 and accompanying text.

2G5 See infra notes 300-305 and accompanying text.
266 See supra notes 256-257 and accompanying text.
267 That is, it deters the confidant from "accidently" leaving the confidential
information where the media might "find" it. See supra notes 256-257 and
accompanying text.
" See supra notes 188-193 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, in order to reach the goals of the tort and to avoid
the problems inherent in an approach that would require intent as
to the publicity element, negligence should also be the mens rea of
the publicity requirement. The confider would have to show that
the confidant was negligent in making the discrete disclosure which
unintentionally resulted in publicity, that is, that it was negligent for
the confidant to disclose the information to a person who she
should have known would publicize the information. Although the
adoption of negligence as the mens rea of the publicity element
would necessarily increase the confidant's risk of liability, the
confidant could insulate herself from this risk by requesting
confidentiality from any individual to whom she discloses the
confidential information. In such a case, the individual would
become a secondary confidant and the original confidant a primary
confidant/secondary confider. If the secondary confidant then
publicized the information, the primary confidant/secondary
confider could hold her liable for breach of confidence. Although,
the primary confidant/secondary confider would not necessary be
"off the hook" in that the original confider could potentially hold
her liable for breach of confidence, the secondary duty of confidentiality would serve to deter any publicity of the information from
the secondary confidant, thereby giving the primary confidant/
secondary confider (who presumably did not intend her disclosure
to result in publicity) a measure of security from the possibility of
liability, and a potential remedy, if the information is in fact
269
publicized by the secondary confidant.
B. Exceptions to the Duty of Confidentiality
Some commentators have argued that too much secrecy in a
society is undesirable.2 70 Admittedly, situations exist where the
needs of society outweigh the confider's interest in confidentiality

269 In such an instance, a chain of potential liability would be forged between the
primary confider, primary confidant/secondary confider and secondary confidant,
with each party being liable to the confider to whom she promised confidentiality.
270 See SISSELA BoK, SECRETS 135 (1983) (asserting that the values protected by
confidentiality are eroded by practices of secrecy); Katz, supra note 1, at 844
(confidentiality agreements between "public figures" and their associates would "serve
to deny society creativity and knowledge that might otherwise inure to it"); see also
Alan Donagan,Justfing Legal Practicein the Adversaty System, in DAVID LUBAN, THE
GOOD LAWYER 123, 144 (1983) (questioning whether confidentiality in the lawyer-

client relationship preserves a client's "dignity"); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical
Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 608-09 (1985).
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and will justify a breach of that duty. In addition, the demands of
the First Amendment may restrict the imposition of liability.
Privileges 271 based on societal interests other than freedom of
expression will be explored briefly here; the possibility of exceptions
272
based on the First Amendment will be dealt with in Part IV.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to delineate fully the
situations where public policy demands that the interest served by
enforcing a confidence are outweighed by other more compelling
societal interests. Some general comments need to be made,
however. Most importantly, the British approach of allowing only
a single "public interest" privilege to the duty of confidence that
permits a court to balance the respective public interests in
confidentiality and disclosure is inadequate for the proposed breach
of confidence tort. 273 The proposed tort's strength is that-in
keeping with the Supreme Court's move towards a clear, line271

In this context "privileged" is meant to denote information which, because of

public policy and First Amendment interests, should not be subject to a duty of
confidentiality.
272 See infra notes 295-392 and accompanying text.
27
3 See e.g., Schering Chems. v. Falkman, Ltd., [1981] 2 W.L.R. 848, 864-65 (Eng.
C.A.) (applying the balancing test and determining that the public interest outweighs
the private interest); see also LAW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 63, 1 6.84(i)
(suggesting that "[i]nformation should only enjoy the protection of the action for
breach of confidence if, after balancing the respective public interests in confidentiality on the one hand and in disclosure or use of the information on the other, the
information is found to merit such protection").
This exception to the duty of confidentiality began in the 1856 British case
Gartside v. Outram, 26 L.J. Ch. 113 (1856), in which the court asserted rather
enigmatically that "[t]here is not confidence as to the disclosure of iniquity." Id. at
114. Since that time, courts have attempted to more clearly define the exception to
the duty of confidentiality. See e.g., Beloff v. Pressdram, [1973] R.P.C. 765 (Eng.).
The Beloff court held that:
The defence... clearly covers.., disclosure which... must be disclosure
in the public interest of matters, carried out or contemplated, in breach of
the country's security, or in breach of law, including statutory duty, fraud,
or otherwise destructive of the country or its people, including matters
medically dangerous to the public; and doubtless other misdeeds of similar

gravity.
Id. at 783-84; see also Initial Servs. Ltd. v. Putteril, [1967] 3 W.L.R. 1032, 1037-39
(Eng.) (applying the exception to allow disclosure of an anti-competitive arrangement
among laundries).
U.S. courts introducing the proposed tort could learn from the British example
and attempt at the start to clarify the specific situations where the interest in
disclosure outweighs the interest in confidentiality. Such limiting of the scope of the

tort's exceptions would ensure that courts are not permitted to engage in ad hoc
balancing of the interests involved-an approach that proved fatal to the private-facts
tort. See supra notes 125-131 and accompanying text.
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drawing approach to resolving the conflict between privacy and First
Amendment interests274-it leads to relatively objective, clearly
drawn lines around a limited amount of information that should not
be disclosed for publication. To impose a broad "public interest"
exception to liability would subject the tort to judicial ad hoc
balancing that, as the private-facts cases demonstrated, would result
in subjectivity, vagueness, and ultimately either chilling of or total
capitulation to First Amendment interests. 275 The privileges, like
the elements of the tort, must therefore be as clearly drawn and
circumscribed as is possible. More importantly, as one commentator has noted, the broad "public interest" privilege in British breach
of confidence law is necessitated by the "potentially sweeping
liability the English general duty of confidentiality would threaten
absent [it]." 2 7 6 Because, unlike its British counterpart, the proposed breach of confidence tort is already very limited in the scope
of the duty it imposes, 277 the information it protects, 278 and its
allowance for discrete disclosures, 279 there is no similar need for
a general exception to guard against overbreadth. The public
interest has already been incorporated into the proposed tort's
elements; therefore, it does not need to overly influence the scope
of its defenses. As one British commentator has remarked on
England's common law:
Breach of confidence provides a limited right to prevent losses of
privacy in a legal system which does not recognize a general right
to privacy. Why make this right subject to further restrictions?
.... To date the law imposes, by way of defense, the limitation
that a confidence will not be enforced where it relates to something detrimental to community interests. What is the justification
for breaching confidences where not detriment, but some positive
benefit, can be shown, and how is this justification to be measured? What is the measure of the values of information which
28 0
justifies a breach of confidence?
The introduction of a public interest exception to the proposed
breach of confidence tort would result in vague and subjective
274

See supra notes 144-173 and accompanying text.

275 See supra notes 118-131 and accompanying text.
276 Vickery, supra note 35, at 1463. For an explanation

British
277 duty of confidence, see supra note 204.
See supra notes 204-240 and accompanying text.
278 See supra notes 241-252 and accompanying text.
279 See supra notes 258-269 and accompanying text.
280 GuRRY, supra note 34, at 477 (footnotes omitted).

of the broad scope of the
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determinations similar to those that ultimately smothered the
private-facts tort.281 A general public interest exception to the
proposed breach of confidence tort would be the death of this tort
as well.

28 2

As an alternative approach, the relatively clear privileges
developed by American courts in professional breach of confidence
cases should act as defenses for the proposed tort. 283 The analogy between the two bodies of law is appropriate in that the duties
of confidence imposed in both are limited in their scope;2 84 both
bodies of law, therefore, share the goal of circumscribing the
exceptions to the duty of confidentiality. 28 5 Commonly recognized categories of information that have been privileged in this
area of the law have included intimations that reveal the individual
is contemplating activities that would be: dangerous to the public
health or safety, 288 or amount to fraud 287 or a crime. 2 88 Also
See supra notes 118-131 and accompanying text.
282 The Supreme Court's decision in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., II1 S. Ct. 2513
(1991), also stands for the proposition that a public interest exception to a duty of
confidence should not be permitted. The case involved the enforcement of a
confidentiality agreement between two journalists and an "active Republican"
associated with a candidate in the 1982 Minnesota gubernatorial race. See id. at 2515.
Despite the fact that the confider was a "political source involved in a political
campaign," id. at 2520 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and that the confider's identity
could have "expanded the universe of information relevant to the choice faced by
Minnesota voters in the State's... gubernatorial election," id. at 2522 (Blackmun,J.,
dissenting), the majority held that the journalists/confidants should be held to their
promise, relying on the fact that the restriction of their First Amendment rights had
been "self-imposed." Id. at 2519. There was no discussion in the Court's opinion of
the significance of the public's interest in this information. See infra notes 321-347
and accompanying text for further discussion of this case.
283 See generally Vickery, supra note 35, at 1463-66 (describing the privileges that
courts have recognized in cases of professional confidence).
284 Compare supra notes 223-226 and accompanying text and infra notes 379-384
and accompanying text with Vickery, supra note 35, at 1463 ("[T]he American duty
of [professional & fiduciary] confidentiality is a limited one .... ").
2 See Vickery, supra note 35, at 1463 (stating that there "is no ... need for a
general exception to guard against overbreadth" in fiduciary/professional confidences
because the scope of the duty is "limited").
286 See e.g., Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (Neb. 1920) (holding that
"[n]o patient can expect that if his malady is found to be of a dangerously contagious
nature, he can still require it to be kept secret"). Somejurisdictions have even ruled
that professionals have a legal duty to reveal a confidence. See e.g., Tarasoff v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342-49 (Cal. 1976) (holding that where
a patient threatens in confidence to kill a third party the doctor must reveal that
281

threat).
287 See, e.g., Hague v. Williams, 181 A.2d 345,348-49 (N.J. 1962) (invalidating the
doctor/patient privilege when the patient's parents fraudulently applied for life
insurance for their sick child).
288 See, e.g., State v. McCray, 551 P.2d 1376, 1378-81 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976)
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privileged are revelations that are demanded by a court, 289 and
those that are necessary in order for the confidant to protect herself
from liability. 290 This list is not exhaustive, and it will be up to
the courts to refine and develop these and other privileges, while
(holding that once bad check is passed, the issuer loses her expectation of privacy).
The question of whether a confidant who merely suspects the confider is involved in
criminal activity should be justified in revealing confidential information exposing the
potential crime, is more difficult. Though innocent confiders will suffer harm from
such an exception, a "suspected crime" privilege should probably be permitted.
Technically, it is the courts, not individual witnesses, that determine whether a crime
has been committed; therefore, to justify a confidant's disclosure only if a crime is in
fact being revealed may impute an unrealistic degree of knowledge to the confidant.
But see Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 408 A.2d 758, 764 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979)
("[A]bsent compulsion by law, a bank may not make any disclosure concerning a
depositor's account without the express or implied consent of the depositor.").
289 All citizens have an obligation to respond to the subpoena of a court or grand
jury to answer questions relevant to a legal investigation:
For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental
maxim that the public.., has a right to every man's evidence. When we
come to examine the various claims of exemption, we start with the primary
assumption that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is
capable of giving and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly
exceptional, being so many derogations from a positive general rule.
8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2192, at 70 (McHaughton rev. 1961) (footnote omitted);
see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) ("Whatever their origins,
these exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created or
expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.").
Some jurisdictions have recognized an exception to this general evidentiary
principle in the case of information divulged in the context of a confidential
relationship. See, e.g., Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1951) (husband-wife
relationship); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632,639 (6th Cir. 1983) (psychotherapist-patient
relationship); United States v. Hodge & Zweigh, 548 F.2d 1347, 1355 (9th Cir. 1977)
(lawyer-client relationship); Cimijotti v. Paulsen, 219 F. Supp. 621, 626 (N.D. Iowa
1963) (priest-penitent relationship). Such evidentiary exceptions have recentlybeen
on the wane. See Dennis Pfaff, Privilege: A Principle in Peril, L.A. DAILYJ., Mar. 18,
1991, atAl (citingerosions in the attorney-client, doctor-patient, and clergy-penitent
privileges). Instead, courts have increasingly demanded the disclosure of confidential
information in trials. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690-91 (1972)
(holding that news reporters must respond to grand jury subpoenas even though they
might be required to reveal a confidential source).
M According to one commentator, the scope of this privilege has been severely
restricted by the courts: "A party may be permitted to breach a confidence to the
extent necessary to defend himself against charges of incompetence, protect himself
against fraud, or perhaps to collect fees, but strict limits have been imposed by some
courts." Vickery, supra note 35, at 1465 (citing Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 804 (N.D. Ohio 1965), which held that a doctor is not
privileged to disclose patient confidences until after the patient has expressly
indicated an intention to sue).
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keeping in mind the caveat that any privileges that are created
should be limited in scope and clearly defined."l
It should be noted that this list of privileges does not include an
exception for public or political figures, and it is this Comment's
position that it should not. Although such personalities have been
denied an action based on invasion of privacy,2 2 a confidant of
a public figure who breaches a duty of confidentiality by publicizing
confidential information has not only denied the public figure her
privacy but also her expectancy of confidentiality. The two interests
are conceptually different; a confider who has arranged for
confidentiality with an intimate has not only expressed a desire for
privacy, but has also now relied on an assurance of confidentiality.293 So, while the public figure may have waived her privacy
interest in the process of becoming a public figure (though even this
concession is arguable), her expectancy of confidentiality based on
her bargain with the confidant remains intact. The concept of
waiver of privacy should not be stretched to deny the public figure
her right to make such bargains. As one commentator said,
"[p]ublic figures, because of their relative lack of privacy, have at
least as great, if not greater, need to be secure in their confidential
2
relationships as private individuals." 9
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BREACH
OF CONFIDENCE TORT

When new causes of action potentially chill the exercise of First
Amendment functions, courts can be expected to be cautious in
their enforcement of them. 2 5 Normally, requiring individuals to
291 See supra notes 273-82 and accompanying text.

292 See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.

293 See Vickery, supra note 35, at 1434 (stating that enforcing duties of confidentiality protects the confider's "general interest in the security of the confidential

relationship and his corresponding expectation of secrecy [and] his specific interest
in avoiding whatever injuries will result from circulation of the information").
M

Id. at 1444-45; see also Katz, supra note 1, at 820. Katz notes:

A review of the contemporary reported cases in which a public figure has
alleged injury from an unauthorized biography demonstrates that many of
the plaintiffs who have taken their claims to trial have not had very strong

claims, and further, have fought doctrine that has longbeen settled in favor
of the press. Thus the precedents in this area of the law may not provide
adequate representative models for a plaintiff who shows that confidence is
breached and whose intimate secrets are publicly disclosed.

Id.

29 5

See William W. Van Alstyne, FirstAmendment Limitations on Recovery from the
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keep their promises does not implicate First Amendment concerns.
An obligation of confidentiality, however, is a promise not to speak.
Because freedom of speech interests are at stake, First Amendment
principles dictate that some limitation must be imposed on the
enforcement of the obligation. 296 Additionally, as formulated
here, the breach of confidence tort imposes what could be interpreted as an obligation not to speak to the media, 1 7 thus implicating
further possible constitutional conflicts with freedom of the press.
This section will investigate the constitutional difficulties that the
proposed tort presents and will demonstrate that neither the
confidant's nor the press's First Amendment rights will present
insurmountable obstacles to recognition of the tort.
A. Confidentiality and the Confidant'sFirst Amendment Rights
Enforcement of the proposed breach of confidence tort raises
the question whether a confidant can waive her First Amendment
right to speak or publish information by agreeing to hold it in
confidence. The question is a difficult one, in that it presents a
conflict between freedom of speech and freedom of contract, both
values basic to our society.298 Though some commentators have
objected to the notion that freedom of speech or press can be
voluntarily waived, 2 " the Supreme Court's First Amendment

Press-An Extended Comment on 'The Anderson Solution, "25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 793,
817-19 (1984) (arguing that courts should be vigilant in applying heightened
constitutional standards to new causes of action that threaten First Amendment
values).
2 The First Amendment prohibits the State from limiting an individual's freedom
of speech. The state action requirement is fulfilled by the confider's attempt to use
the state's judicial machinery to sanction, even civilly, speech that breaches a
confidential relationship. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265
(1964) (holding that a state rule of law imposing impermissible restriction on the
federal constitutional freedoms of speech and press fulfills the "state action"
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment); Hill, supra note 87, at 1295 n.424
("[A]ttempted suppression of... [confidential] information by resort to the courts
would immediately pose a first amendment problem."); see also Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (holding that the state law
imposition of the burden of proof in libel suits constitutes state action); NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,916 n.51 (1982) (holding that the state action
requirement is met through the application of state law in a civil lawsuit).
' See supra notes 258-69 and accompanying text.
M-See Blount v. Smith, 231 N.E.2d 301, 305 (Ohio 1967) ("The right to contract
freely with the expectation that the contract shall endure according to its terms is as
fundamental to our society as the right to write and to speak without restraint.").
299 See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 396 (1985) (rejecting the
notion of waiver of First Amendment rights because "it rests on a mistaken analogy
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decisions have made clear that the right to disclose truthful
information can be restrained if the individual voluntarily agrees to
waive her First Amendment rights. In the first of these cases, Snepp
v. United States,300 the Supreme Court held that First Amendment
rights could be waived. In Snepp, a former CIA employee who had
signed an agreement not to disclose classified information without
prepublication clearance published a book without the required
review. The government brought suit in contract to enforce the
agreement. 0 1 In holding for the government, the Court emphasized that a "trust relationship" s°2 had been established between
the agency and the defendant:
[The defendant's] employment with the CIA involved an extremely
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agreement
that he signed, [the defendant] explicitly recognized that he was
entering a trust relationship. The trust agreement specifically
imposed the obligation not to publish any information relating to
the Agency without submitting the information for clearance....
[By] publish[ing] his book about CIA activities on the basis of [his
employment] background and exposure ... [the defendant]
deliberately and surreptitiously violated his obligation to submit all
303
material for prepublication review.
The defendant's freedom of speech defense3°4 was rejected by the
Court because the defendant had "expressly," "voluntarily," and
without "duress" obligated himself to submit any proposed
publication to prior review.30 5 Waiver of the right to speak and
publish information was, therefore, constitutionally permissible in
this case where these requirements were met.
The Court, however, advanced another basis for its decision in
Snepp-essentially a strict scrutiny balancing of the interests
underlying the waiver of the employee's First Amendment rights:
Moreover, this Court's cases make clear that-even in the absence of
an express agreement-the CIA could have acted to protect substantial
between a constitutional right and a piece of property"); Hill, supra note 87, at 1294
("Whether on a theory of waiver of constitutional rights or some other theory, such
uncritical enforcement of a contractual obligation of secrecy seems egregiously
wron.").
444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
30l See id. at 508.
302 Id. at 510.
303 Id. at 510-11.
3o4 See id. at 509 n.3 ("[The defendant] relies primarily on the claim that his
agreement is unenforceable as a prior restraint on protected speech.").
so5 See i&
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government interests by imposing reasonable restrictions on
employee activities that in other contexts might be protected by
the First Amendment. The Government has a compelling interest
in protecting both the secrecy of information important to our
national security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential
to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service. The
agreement that Snepp signed is a reasonable means for protecting
this vital interest.306
Therefore, Snepp may stand not for the constitutional sanction of
waiving First Amendment rights, but for the less remarkable
proposition that freedom of speech is overwhelmed when national
security is at stake.3 0 7 The difficulty that the latter proposition
presents for the proposed breach of confidence tort is apparent:
the waiver of First Amendment rights inherent in an agreement of
confidentiality between private citizens will rarely be supported by
interests rising to the level of national significance. Following the
Supreme Court's recent decisions in Rust v. Sullivan30 8 and Cohen
306Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
307 But see Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,421

U.S. 992 (1975). In Knopf, the Fourth Circuit, faced with facts almost identical to
those in Snepp, held for the government, resting its opinion solely on the defendant's
waiver of his right to speak. The court enjoined the publication of a former CIA
employee's book containing unauthorized and "confidential" disclosures. As part of
the terms of his employment, the employee had signed a "secrecy agreement" barring
the disclosure of classified information acquired during the course of his employment. The court held that "by his execution of the secrecy agreement and his entry
into the confidential employment relationship, [the former employee] effectively
relinquished his First Amendment rights" to disclose the information covered by the
agreement. Id. at 1370. The opinion made no mention of the government's interest
in controlling the secrecy of information that might be harmful to national security
if disclosed. Rather, the defendant's waiver of his First Amendment rights was
dispositive.
It should be noted that in Knopf, the employee's waiver of his right to speak
justified a prior restraint of the confidential information. The Supreme Court has
made clear that only the most compelling interests justify a prior restraint of even
confidential information. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v United States, 403 U.S. 713,
730 (1971) (per curiam) (StuartJ, concurring) (noting that prior restraint requires
a showing that the disclosure "will surely result in direct, immediate and irreparable
damage to our Nation or its people"); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402
U.S. 415, 419 (1971) ("Any prior restraint of expression... [has] a 'heavy presumption' against its constitutional validity."); Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393
U.S. 175,181 (1968) (any prior restraint upon speech "suppresses the precise freedom
which the First Amendment sought to protect against abridgment"). Since the Fourth
Circuit based its decision in Knopf on the employee's waiver of his right to speak
rather than on the possible consequences of disclosure, it evidently believed that the
interest in protecting confidentiality agreements was itself quite compelling.
308 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
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v. Cowles Media Co., 4°9

however, it is clear that strict scrutiny
balancing does not constitute a condition precedent to waiver of
freedom of speech. 1 0 In both decisions, the Court held that a
waiver of First Amendment rights was constitutional without regard
to the significance of the interests served by the waiver.
In Rust, a group of doctors and recipients of family planning
funds under Title X of the Public Health Service Act3 l l brought
suit challenging the constitutionality of regulations3 12 promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.3 13
The
regulations prohibited Title X fund supervisors from engaging in
counseling concerning, referrals for, and activities advocating
abortion as a method of family planning.3 14 The petitioners
claimed, inter alia, that the regulations abridged the free speech
rights of the doctors who supervised Title X funds in that they were
not permitted to discuss the option of abortion with grant recipients.3 15 Employing only the doctrine of waiver, the Supreme
Court upheld the regulation's suppression of the doctors' freedom
of speech:
Individuals who are voluntarily employed for a Title X project must
perform their duties in accordance with the regulation's restrictions on abortion counseling and referral. The employees remain
free, however, to pursue abortion-related activities when they are
not acting under the auspices of the Title X project.... The
employees' freedom of expression is limited during the time that they
actually work for the project; but this limitationis a consequence of their
decision to accept employment in a project, the scope of which is
permissibly restricted by the funding authority. 1
S9 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
310 See infra notes 319-20 & 335-40
311
312

and accompanying text.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 to 300a-6 (1989).
See 42 C.F.R. § 59.2 (1989).

313 See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1764-66 (1991).
314 See id. at 1765.
315 See id. at 1775.

316 Id. (emphasis added). The Court also employed the concept ofwaiver to deny
petitioners' claim that the regulations infringed on the First Amendment rights of
privately funded speech. The petitioners argued that "since Title X requires that
grant recipients contribute to the financing of Title X project through the use of
matching funds and grant-related income, the regulation's restrictions on abortion
counseling and advocacy penalize privately funded speech." Id. at 1775 n.5. In
rejecting this challenge, the Court again invoked the principle of waiver.
We find this argument flawed for several reasons. First, Title X subsidies
are just that, subsidies. The recipient is in no way compelled to operate a
Title X project; to avoid the force of the regulations, it can simply decline

2454 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 140:2385

Asserting that the interests underlying the Title X doctors' waiver
need not be "compelling," the Court upheld regulations that
restricted their right to speak solely because the restrictions were
voluntarily consented to when the public funds were accepted. 1 7
The Court, therefore, clearly departed from the Snepp strict scrutiny
balancing approach.3 18 The Court, in fact, engaged in no balancing of the interests placed in conflict by the regulation-the doctors'
waiver vitiated their claim of violation.3 19 Rust thus stands for the
the subsidy.... By accepting Title Xfunds, a recipient voluntarily consents to
any restrictionsplaced on any matchingfundsorgrant-relatedincome. Potential
grant recipients can choose between accepting Title X funds ... or
declining the subsidy and financing their own unsubsidized program. We
have never held that the Government violates the First Amendment simply

by offering that choice.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
317 The dissent in Rust also acknowledged the novelty of the majority's position
that voluntary waiver alone, without any balancing of the interests at stake, was
sufficient to overcome First Amendment rights:
Until today, the Court never has upheld viewpoint-based suppression of
speech simply because that suppression was a condition upon the acceptance of public funds. Whatever may be the Government's power to
condition the receipt of its largess upon the relinquishment of constitutional
rights, it surely does not extend to a condition that suppresses the
recipient's cherished freedom of speech based solely upon the content or
viewpoint of that speech.... At the least, such conditions require courts
to balance the speaker's interest in the message against those of government
in preventing its dissemination.
Rust,18111 S. Ct. at 1780, 1783 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
3 See supra notes 306-07 and accompanying text.
319 See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1784 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (stating that the majority
"fail[ed] to balance or even to consider the free speech interests claimed by Title X
physicians against the Government's asserted interest in suppressing the speech").
A strong argument could be made that if the interests were balanced in this case,
those supporting the doctrine of waiver would be found wanting. A doctor's interest
in disclosing information concerning abortion is "clear and vital." Id. at 1783
(Blackmun,J., dissenting). According to the Council on Ethical andJudicial Affairs
of the American Medical Association, "[t]he patient's right of self-decision can be
effectively exercised only if the patient possesses enough information to enable an
intelligent choice.... The physician has an ethical obligation to help the patient
make choices from among the therapeutic alternatives consistent with good medical
practice."

COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AMA, CURRENT
OPINIONS 18.08 (1989) (quoted in Rust, 11 S. Ct. at 1783 (Blackmun,J., dissenting)).

On the other hand, the government's stated interest in restricting the doctors'
right to speak-"ensuring that federal funds are not spent for a purpose outside the
scope of the program'-seems to fall short of that necessary tojustify the suppression
of information that is not only truthful, but that doctors are also ethically obligated
to disclose. See id. at 1783-84 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (arguing that the regulations
are not narrowly tailored to meet the government's stated interest). Even in the face
of strong interests compelling disclosure, the Court sanctioned the doctors' waiver
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proposition that it is permissible, regardless of the significance of
the First Amendment interests at stake, to condition the dispensing
of government benefits on the fulfillment of requirements that limit
freedom of speech when the individual affected has voluntarily
waived her First Amendment rights. 20
The Court again upheld a waiver of First Amendment rights
without balancing the interests served (or inhibited) by the waiver
in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. 3 21 The Court's application of the
waiver doctrine in Cohen, however, went beyond that presented by
the facts in Rust in that the restriction of First Amendment rights
was not a condition placed upon receipt of government largesse, but
was the result of an agreement between private parties. The Court
in Cohen, in fact, explicitly sanctioned the waiver of First Amendment rights in order to enforce an agreement of confidentiality
between two private parties.
The plaintiff in Cohen, an "active Republican" associated with a
candidate in the 1982 Minnesota gubernatorial race, gave two
journalists information relating to an opposing candidate's arrest
record3 22 in exchange for a promise of confidentiality.3 23 The
reporters later breached this obligation by identifying the plaintiff
in their publications as the source of the information.3 24 As a
result, the plaintiff lost his job3 25 and he sued the newspapers
based on promissory estoppel for breach of the confidential
agreement.3 26 The newspapers pleaded the First Amendment as
3 27
a defense to the suit.
of their right to speak. It is obvious then, that the Court is strongly committed to the
constitutional sanctity of voluntary, informed consent. See infra notes 335-340 and
accompanying text for a similar analysis of the Court's approach to the sufficiency of
waiver in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
320 The Court in Rust has thus employed the concept of waiver of constitutional
rights to resolve one aspect of the general problem of constitutionally questionable
conditions placed upon the receipt of government benefits. See Seth Kreimer,
AllocationalSanctions: The Problem ofNegative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 1293 (1984), for a general discussion of the constitutionality of conditioning
government largesse on requirements that restrict constitutional rights.
321 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
322 The information related to the opposing candidate's convictions more than a
decade
earlier for unlawful assembly and petit theft. See id. at 2516.
32 3 See id.
324 See id.
32 See id.
326 Although the stated cause of action was promissory estoppel, the suit was the
result (as the Court acknowledged) of a breach of an underlying duty of confidence.
See id.; see also infra text accompanying note 328.
32 See Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2516.
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According to the Supreme Court, the issue presented in Cohen
was "whether the First Amendment prohibits a plaintiff from
recovering damages, under state promissory estoppel law, for a
newspaper's breach of a promise of confidentiality given to the
plaintiff in exchange for information." 28 The Court held for the
plaintiff, asserting that "the First Amendment does not confer on
the press a constitutional right to disregard promises that would
otherwise be enforced under state law." 329 Relying on the "wellestablished line of decisions holding that generally applicable laws
do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather
and report the news,"33 0 the Court determined that Minnesota
state law (i.e. the doctrine of promissory estoppel) requiring
journalists who "make ... promises to keep them"33 1 was a
neutral law of general applicability whose enforcement against the
press was not prohibited by the First Amendment.33 2 The fact
that enforcing such agreements might inhibit the media-confidants'
First Amendment rights was, according to the Court, "no more than
the incidental, and constitutionally insignificant, consequence" of
the generally applicable law requiring "those who make certain
3 33
kinds of promises to keep them."
S28 Id.

32 Id. at 2519.
33o Id. at 2518 (citing in support of this proposition: Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (holding that the press must obey copyright
laws); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding that the press must respond
to grand jury subpoenas); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186
(1946) (holding that the press must obey the Fair Labor Standards Act); Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (holding that the press must obey the
antitrust laws); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (holding that the press
must pay non-discriminatory taxes); and Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103
(1937) (holding that the press must obey the National Labor Relations Act)). After
a review of this case law, the Cohen Court concluded that the press did not have any
.special immunity from the application of general laws" and that "[a]ccordingly,
enforcement of such general laws against the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny
than would be applied to enforcement against other persons or organizations." Id.
at 2518.
331 Id. at 2519.
332 The Court explained:
There can be little doubt that the Minnesota doctrine of promissory
estoppel is a law of general applicability. It does not target or single out the
press. Rather, in so far as we are advised, the doctrine is generally
applicable to the daily transactions of all the citizens of Minnesota. The
First Amendment does not forbid its application to the press.
Id. at 2518-19.
333 Id. at 2519.
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In addition, the Court's decision in Cohen rejected any balancing
of First Amendment interests that may be infringed by confidentiality agreements because the burden on these rights is "self-imposed"
by the confidant's voluntary promise of secrecy.3 3 4 Unlike its
private-facts decisions, the Court asserted that the constitutionality
of a confidentiality agreement does not require a strict scrutiny
analysis because the parties to the agreement,3 3 5 not the State,
restrict their own First Amendment rights:
In [Florida Star v. B.J.F, 491 U.S. 524 (1989), and Smith v. Daily
Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979)], the State itself defined
the content of publications that would trigger liability. Here, by
contrast, Minnesota law simply requires those making promises to
keep them. The parties themselves, as in this case, determine the scope
of their legal obligationsand any restrictionswhich may be placed on the
3 36
publicationof truthful information are self-imposed

Therefore, according to the Court, enforcing voluntary agreements
in which a confidant has waived her First Amendment rights cannot
be said to be "'punish[ing]' [her] for publishing truthful information";33 7 an individual is not punished when she is held to a
promise that she has knowingly and voluntarily made, even if the
promise waives First Amendment rights. If the law permitting the
waiver is generally applicable, i.e. not targeted at the press, s33 any
detriment to First Amendment interests that results from enforcing
the individual's waiver is "incidental" and "constitutionally insignificant."33 9 It is, therefore, unnecessary to engage in strict scrutiny
4
balancing of the interests underlying the waiver.m
Because the confider in Cohen was a political figure involved in
a political debate 4 and the confidant was a member of the press,
the case presents the quintessential constitutional test of private

...

334 See id. at 2522-23 (Souter,J., dissenting) (asserting that the "majority's position
dispense[s] with balancing because the burden on publication is ... voluntary"

and is characterized as an incidental result of a neutral law of general applicability).
335
See supra notes 306-07 and accompanying text.
336
Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2519 (emphasis added).
37
Id.
338 See supra text accompanying notes 330-32.
339 Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2519 (acknowledging that "maintain[ing] a cause of action
for promissory estoppel will inhibit truthful reporting" but dismissing any accompanying infringement of First Amendment rights as "constitutionally insignificant").
340 See id. at 2518.
341 See id. at 2520 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (calling the plaintiff a "'political
source involved in a political campaign'") (quoting Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457
N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991)).
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promises of confidentiality. The Court's rejection of a strict
scrutiny analysis advanced in Snepp and its embrace of the belief
that it is constitutionally permissible to waive First Amendment
rights, should not be underestimated. While it is probably true that
the confidant in most breach of confidence cases would not be a
member of the press, this anomaly in Cohen, if anything, strengthens
the case's precedential value in an argument advocating the
establishment of a breach of confidence tort. If there are no
constitutional infirmities when a journalist waives her right to
disclose confidential information,342 it is unlikely that there will

be any constitutional impediments to a non-media confidant waiving
3 43
her right to disclose confidential information.
It should also be emphasized that the waiver of First Amendment rights in Cohen was allowed despite very significant interests
compelling disclosure of the information. First, the Court's
enforcement of the confidentiality agreement between confider and
confidant in Cohen inhibited the reporting of truthful information
regarding a political campaign, an area where the protection of First
Amendment rights has traditionally been considered imperative. 344 As the Minnesota Supreme Court asserted when deciding
in favor of the journalists-confidants in the predecessor case to
Cohen:

Of critical significance in this case... is the fact that the promise
of anonymity arises in the classic First Amendment context of the
quintessential public debate in our democratic society, namely, a
political source involved in a political campaign. The potentiality
for civil damages for promises made in this context chills public
debate ....
In this context, and considering the nature of the

342 See infra notes 349-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unique,
constitutionally protected role that the press plays in American society.
34 In Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1977), a New York court held that
waiver of First Amendment rights was possible as a result of an agreement of
confidentiality between two "private" parties. In Doe, a former patient brought a
breach of confidential relationship suit against her psychiatrist for publishing a book
disclosing her thoughts, feelings, emotions, and fantasies. The court held that the
patient's interest in confidentiality was important enough to overcome the doctor's
First Amendment interests and to justify enforcing the agreement by preventing
publication of the book. Id. at 675. The court also noted that the defendant's
reliance on the Supreme Court's defamation cases "would appear to be misplaced.
In none of them is a contractual duty to maintain confidence involved." Id.
3" See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) ("Without the
information provided by the press most of us and many of our representatives would
be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on the administration of
government generally.").
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political story involved, it seems to us that the law best leaves the
45
parties here to their trust in each other.3
The result in Cohen demonstrates that the Supreme Court obviously
holds the sanctity of contract and confidentiality somewhat higher
than the Minnesota Supreme Court. Similarly, it should be noted
that the waiver of First Amendment rights in Cohen was allowed
despite the detrimental effect that enforcement of such obligations
may have on the press's news-gathering capabilities in general. As
the majority admitted: "permitting [the confider] to maintain a
cause of action [in this case] ...

will inhibit truthful reporting

because news organizations will have legal incentives not to disclose
a confidential source's identity even when that person's identity is
itself newsworthy."3 4 6 On the other hand, the State's interest in
maintaining confidentiality extends little farther than the confider's
interest in his own privacy and his expectation that his agreements
with others will be honored. Taken together, the interests underlying the facts of Cohen are actually the mirror opposite of those in
Snepp in that, in the latter case national security interests compelled
concealment of the confidential information; in Cohen, however, there
were strong interests compelling disclosure of the confidential
information.3 47 Nevertheless, in both cases, the Court enforced
agreements of confidentiality and the waivers of First Amendment
rights that formed their basis. Thus, the typical breach of confidence case will turn not on whether a waiver of First Amendment
rights advances significant state interests, but on whether the waiver
was explicit and voluntary.
In sum, based on the Court's holdings in Snepp, Rust, and Cohen,
it is clear that the proposed breach of confidence tort would not
unconstitutionally infringe the confidant's First Amendment rights.
The proposed tort would meet the constitutional mandate by
requiring that the confidentiality agreement be explicit and
voluntarily, thereby ensuring that any waiver of First Amendment
345 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 1990), rev'd, 111 S.
Ct. 2513 (1991); see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2523 (Souter,

J., dissenting) ("There can be no doubt that the fact of [the confider's] identity
expanded the universe of information relevant to the choice faced by Minnesota
voters in that State's 1982 gubernatorial election, the publication of which was thus
of the sort quintessentially subject to strict First Amendment protection.").
346 Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2519.
17 There were also strong interests compelling disclosure of the restricted
information in Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). See supra note 319.
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rights is left to the individual who will bear the burden of confidentiality-the confidant herself.34s
That the proposed tort will effectively meet the First Amendment attacks that a confidant may use to challenge it is not only
constitutionally permissible but also equitable. Enforcement of a

confidant's waiver of her right to disseminate information that she
has agreed to hold in confidence is well grounded in fundamental
fairness. A confidant who freely makes an informed choice not to
reveal confidential information should not be released from her
agreement when it becomes inconvenient or when she stands to
gain from the breach. To allow the confidant to benefit to the
confider's detriment through disclosure of information that she
possesses only because she has promised secrecy seems especially
repulsivez The Supreme Court's embrace of the concept of waiver
constitutes tacit acknowledgement that the First Amendment is not
meant to protect such behavior.
B. Confidentiality and the Press's First Amendment Rights
If the proposed breach of confidence tort were enforced, a
confidant would be deterred from publicizing confidential information. Consequently, a confidant would have less of an incentive to
be a source of confidential information to the press. It is therefore
possible that the press's First Amendment rights would be impermissibly inhibited by recognition of the proposed tort. This section
will demonstrate that the breach of confidence approach to privacy

M In addition, the other elements of the proposed tort guarantee that the scope
of the obligation of confidence is narrowly tailored, thereby ensuring that the
confidant's First Amendment rights are not inhibited to a greater extent than
necessary. First, the "publicity" requirement ensures that the tort does not
encompass discrete disclosures not amounting to publicity. See supra notes 258-269
and accompanying text. Second, the tort's "inaccessibility" requirement limits the
confidentiality obligation to only that information not already in the public domain,
thereby ensuring that the confidant's waiver is limited to information that could
actually harm the confider if publicly exposed. The confidant will suffer little harm
from the public disclosure of information which is already public knowledge, and
such disclosures will therefore be privileged. See supra notes 241-52 and accompanying text. In addition, the tort's "unauthorized" requirement permits disclosures to
which the confider has consented, thereby providing a possible avenue by which the
confidant can restore her First Amendment rights. See supra notes 253-57 and
accompanying text. Finally, the specific exceptions to the duty of confidence
delineated in Part III, see supra notes 270-94 and accompanying text, will ensure that
in certain extreme situations the confidant's waiver of her First Amendment rights
can be ignored-for example, when necessary to protect herself or society from
physical harm, fraud, or the perpetration of crime.
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protection both would not unconstitutionally infringe freedom of
the press and would actually provide a better balance between
privacy and freedom of the press interests than the private-facts
tort.
In its First Amendment cases, the Supreme Court has identified
at least three different societal functions that the press fulfills: it is
a conduit of individual expression, a vehicle for societal education
and debate, and a check on government power.349 Fundamental
to the fulfillment of all of these functions is access to information.
If there is too much restraint on the flow of information, the press
will be unable to satisfy its role within the constitutional
350
scheme.
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom ...

...

of the press."3 51 Although the Su-

preme Court has interpreted this amendment to mean that
members of the press are protected in both their news-gathering3 52 and publishing3 53 activities, it has extended greater First
Amendment protection to publishing activities as they more directly
implicate the core functions of the press, that is, the dissemination
of information and ideas of public importance.3 ' When these
9

See Michael Dicke, Note, Promisesand the Press: FirstAmendment Limitations on
News Source Recovety for Breach of a ConfidentialityAgreement, 73 MINN. L. REv. 1553,
1558-59 (1989) (summarizing the constitutional bases for these three functions of the
press).
--0 See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) ("[T]he First
Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of
individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which
members of the public may draw."); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
492 (1975) ("Without the information provided by the press most of us and many of
our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on
the administration of government generally."); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 278-79 (1964).
35 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
352 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) ("[Wlithout some protection
for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.").
353 See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829,838 (1978)
(rejecting on First Amendment grounds a criminal conviction for publication of
confidential information); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 US. 713, 714
(1971) (denying prior restraint of expression).
354 See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 800 (Burger, C.J., concurring)
("[T]he Press Clause [of the First Amendment] focuses specifically on the liberty to
disseminate expression broadly.... ."). CompareNew York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730
3

(StewartJ, concurring) (stating that there is no prior restraint of publication unless

it "will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or
its people") with Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681, 707 (holding that there is no news
gathering privilege allowingjournalists to withhold their sources from grand juries).
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constitutionally protected activities conflict with other legitimate
interests, however, the Court has recognized the importance of
conflicting fundamental values, and has not given the press absolute
protection.3 55 In its decisions, the Court has stressed the importance of creating standards that both balance the interests at
stake 3 M and give a measure of "breathing room" for the
press.3 57 A vague, overbroad standard that does not give the
press adequate forewarning of liability is unconstitutional because
uncertainty as to the boundaries between protected and unprotected
3 58
speech may result in press self-censorship of protected speech.
Using these constitutional principles as guidelines, this subsection
will demonstrate that the proposed tort creates an equitable and
constitutional balance of press and privacy interests.3 59

For an overview of the constitutionally protected functions that the press serves, see
Dicke, supra note 349, at 1558-59.
355 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,345-46 (1974) (rejecting the
suggestion of absolute protection for the media because it would totally sacrifice the
countervailing values militating against defamation).
356 See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961). The Konigsberg Court held:
[State laws affecting the content of speech] have been found justified by
subordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequisite to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of the governmental interest
involved.... Whenever, in such a context, these constitutional protections
are asserted against the exercise of valid governmental powers a reconciliation must be effected, and that perforce requires an appropriate weighing
of the respective interests involved.
Id. at 51 (citations omitted); see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341 (balancing the interest in
freedom of the press and the interest in avoiding defamation); Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959) ("Where First Amendment rights are asserted to bar
governmental interrogation resolution of the issues always involves a balancing by the
courts of the competing private and public interests at stake in the particular
shown.").
circumstances
357 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
3M See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
359 One commentator summarized the standards that would measure the
constitutionality of any new "privacy tort" as follows:
This narrowed tort would have to be defined precisely and clearly
enough that a publisher would have fair warning of the approximate
location of the line between protected and unprotected revelations.
Although the Supreme Court has consistently refused to rule that any
speech-including accurate speech-is absolutely protected by the Constitution, the Court has also been equally insistent that the Constitution
condemns vague regulation. The Court has stated repeatedly that vague
proscriptions against speech may chill the willingness of individuals and the
media to take part in those communicative activities that are clearly
protected by the first amendment. The Court has developed the doctrines
of vagueness and overbreadth to address this concern.
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First, by targeting the source of information for liability, rather
than the publisher,3 60 the breach of confidence tort avoids the
conflict between freedom of press and privacy interests that was a
primary cause of the private-facts tort's demise.3 61 With the
interment of the private-facts tort and the recognition of the
proposed breach of confidence cause of action, publishers would no
longer be held liable for disclosures of embarrassing information.3 62

In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,3 63 the Supreme Court

acknowledged that an action based on breach of confidence is less

Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 342-43 (footnote omitted). The proposed breach of
confidence tort overcomes these constitutional objections. See infra notes 360-392
and accompanying text.
M Admittedly, the distinction between press and source is not crystal clear. The
Supreme Court has implied that the Press Clause protects either persons or
institutions performing press functions. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 781-84 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). It has also
suggested that "[a] reporter is no better than his source of information." Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,722 (1972) (DouglasJ., dissenting). Furthermore, the source
may in fact be the reporter as, for example, in the case of an autobiographer. Thus,
it is possible that the Court would view the source as a reporter of sorts, within the
umbrella of freedom of the press protection. In any event, the bifurcation between
press and source on which the proposed tort relies is not always obvious.
A number of responses can be made to this argument. First, the Court's
decisions have demonstrated that the press's news gathering activities are not as
constitutionally protected as its publishing activities. See supra notes 352-354 and
accompanying text. To the extent then that the source falls within the news gathering
category, she cannot expect the extreme protection that the Court gives to
publication rights. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) ("The right to speak and
publish does not carry with it the unrestricted right to gather information.").
Additionally, the Court has indicated in a number of its decisions the potential
constitutionality of directly suing those who leak information to the press. See supra
notes 196-200 and accompanying text. Therefore, it can be inferred that the Court
does not think that sources have any special privilege because of their involvement
in the workings of the media. Finally, the distinction that this argument relies on is
really only one of semantics. The Court has never distinguished between freedom of
speech and freedom of the press in its opinions. See Nimmer, supranote 181, at 935.
It has never indicated that the right to free speech should weigh any heavier than the
right to a free press. Thus, to the extent that freedom of speech can be waived by a
confidentiality agreement, see supra notes 304-305 and accompanying text, so can
freedom of the press.
361 See supra notes 112-31 and accompanying text.
362 Two exceptions must be made to this statement. First, a publisher could be
held liable under the proposed tort if she or a member of her organization agreed
to hold information from a source in confidence. For a discussion of this possibility,

see supranote 219. Second, the press could be held liable for publishing information
that was not "lawfully obtained." See supra notes 157-165 and accompanying text and
note 201.
3" 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991). For a summary of the facts of this case, see supra notes
321-327 and accompanying text.
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constitutionally problematic than one based on invasion of privacy.3 64 When addressing the First Amendment problems presented by two journalists who breached their promise of anonymity to
a confider, the Court in Cohen distinguished its earlier private-facts

holdings in FloridaStar v. B.J.F.3 65 and Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. 36 by asserting that "[i]n those cases, the State itself de67
fined the content of publications that would trigger liability."3
The contract cause of action based on breach of confidence at issue
in Cohen,16' however, was less constitutionally suspect in that the

State was not directly punishing the publication of information but
"simply requir[ing] those making promises to keep them." 69 It
is the parties to the confidentiality agreement themselves who
"determine the scope of their legal obligations and any restrictions
which may be placed on the publication of truthful information are

self-imposed."37 0

Consequently, in a jurisdiction recognizing the

breach of confidence tort, journalists would not be subject to legal
sanction based on the subjective, inconsistentjudicial definitions of
"newsworthiness" and "offensiveness."3 71 Since sources bear the

risk of liability, journalists could print with impunity any information which they had legally obtained.3 72 Therefore, the enforce364 See Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2519.
491 U.S. 524 (1989). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 153-170 and
accompanying text.
M 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
37 Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2519.
3" While the stated cause ofaction in Cohen was promissory estoppel rather than
breach of confidence, the use of this case as precedent is warranted here because the
claim of estoppel was founded on ajournalist's broken promise of confidentiality.
See id. at 2516 ("The question before us is whether the First Amendment prohibits a
plaintiff from recovering damages, under state promissory estoppel law, for a
newspaper's breach of a promise of confidentiality given to the plaintiff in exchange
for information.").
69 Id. at 2519.
370 Id.
371 Of course, community mores (as expressed by demand for the media's

product) and journalistic ethics would still act as restraints on what is published.
Moreover, if the journalist agrees to hold information from a source in confidence,
a breach of this obligation could result in liability under the proposed tort. See supra
note 219.
372 The scope of the press's liability under a breach of confidence tort would be
no different from that of the "lawfully obtained" doctrine defined by the Supreme
Court in Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989). See supra note 201. Under both
torts the press would be allowed to print any information that was lawfully obtained.
Had B.J.F. been able to take advantage of a breach of confidence tort, however, there
would be one very important difference in the result of the case: where the "lawfully
obtained" doctrine blocked B.J.F.'s private-facts remedy against the publisher of the
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ment of the proposed cause of action would not have a chilling
effect on journalists' editorial decisions like that which plagues
3 73
journalists currently subject to the private-facts tort.
It might be argued, however, that the breach of confidence tort
would still "punish" the press in that journalists will have to pay
more money for information from sources concerned about liability
for breaching a confidence. The breach of confidence tort would,
therefore, still place a burden on freedom of the press. While it is
true that the proposed tort might make confidants demand higher
remuneration before divulging confidences, the flaw in this
argument is, as the Supreme Court asserted in Cohen,3 74 that it
construes such payments as a punishment of the press rather than
the necessary cost of publishing confidential information:
[C]ompensatory damages are not a form of punishment.... If the
contract between the parties [obligating them to a duty of
confidentiality] in this case had contained a liquidated damages
provision, it would be perfectly clear that the payment to [the
confider upon breach of that contract] would represent a cost of
acquiring newsworthy material to be published at a profit, rather
than a punishment imposed by the State. The payment of
compensatory damages in this case is constitutionally indistinguishable from a generous bonus paid to a confidential news
3 75
source.
information, it would not have blocked a breach of confidence remedy against the
source of the information.
373 The fact that the publisher of information will not be held liable under the
proposed tort avoids the facial underinclusiveness of prohibitions sanctioning mass
media publishers of truthful personal information but not other disseminators of the
same information. In FloridaStar,the Court rejected a statute that "prohibit[ed] the
publication of identifying information only if this information appears in an
'instrument of mass communication'" because a State must not "punish[] truthful
publication in the name of privacy... [unless] it... demonstrate[s] its commitment
to advancing this interest by applying its prohibition evenhandedly, to the smalltime
disseminator as well as the media giant." 491 US. at 540.
The proposed tort eludes underinclusiveness analysis in that it does not pivot
liability on publication by or in the media, but on the broader notion of publicity in
general. See supra notes 258-69 and accompanying notes. Liability attaches if
confidential information is disclosed in the media or by any other means amounting
to publicity. See supra note 109 for exemplary cases. Therefore, liability could very
well attach to "the backyard gossip who tells 50 people" or the "smalltime disseminator," as required by the Court's reading of the underinclusiveness doctrine. See
FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 540. In addition, the proposed tort might entirely skirt the
underinclusiveness issues associated with "punishing truthful publication" simply
because it does not sanction publishers. See id.
374 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
375 Id. at 2519.

2466 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 140:2385

The notion underlying the Court's decision in Cohen is clear:
confidential information is a commodity, like any other, for which
the press must pay.- 76 The fact that the confidential relationship
in Cohen was between members of the press and their source, and
therefore can be distinguished from the more typical breach of
confidence case where the confidant will be a non-media related
individual, only strengthens the argument in favor of the breach of
confidence tort. In Cohen, the press, because they were parties to
the confidential relationship, bore the burden of liability for the
breach of confidence directly, and yet the Court held that this
burden was not unconstitutional. Thus, in the more typical breach
of confidence case that would impose the burden of liability on the
press only indirectly-thatis, by paying more money for confidential
information from confidants-the Court would also not find a
constitutional infirmity. Therefore, the monetary burdens that the
proposed tort would impose on the press, albeit not insignificant,
would not amount to an unconstitutional infringement on freedom
3 77
of the press.
376 Similarly, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 US. 562 (1977),

the Court held:
The Constitution no more prevents a State from requiring [the mediadefendant] to compensate petitioner for broadcasting his act on television
than it would privilege [the media-defendant] to film and broadcast a
copyrighted dramatic work without liability to the copyright owner ....
No social purpose is served by having the defendant get free some
aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would
normally pay.
Id. at 575-76 (quoting Kalven, supra note 85, at 331).
37 In addition, any indirect burden of liability imposed on the press by the
proposed tort is alleviated by the fact that predicting whether the source will be held
liable for her breach will be easier than predicting liability under the private-facts tort.
Seesupra note 235 and accompanying text. As opposed to the private-facts tort, which
forces editors to make publication decisions based on vague and subjective notions
of "newsworthiness" and "offensiveness," the elements of the breach of confidence
tort are more concrete. Therefore, calculation of a source's potential costs from
disclosure would be more accurate. For example, the possibility of litigation could
be determined based upon the number of people who have been bound to keep the
information in confidence (the more confidants with which the confider shared the
information, the less likely that the editor's source will be suspected of the disclosure
and brought to court by the confider). See supra note 234. The outcome of litigation
would be based on the circumscribed questions of whether there was an explicit
agreement of confidentiality and whether the information disclosed was bound by this
agreement. Thus, rejecting the debate over the vague, subjective scope of
"newsworthiness" in favor of the objectivity of contract principles would produce a
more predictable and efficient accounting of potential litigation costs. This would in
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Another potential constitutional objection to the breach of
confidence tort is that it will effectively deny the press access to a
large amount of information-access that is necessary for the media
to fulfill its role as disseminator of information and ideas of public
importance.3 7 8 In fact, the proposed breach of eonfidence tort
would provide only a limited amount of information protection,
much less than that potentially protected by the private-facts tort.
The privacy protection provided by the proposed tort would be
limited in five major ways. First, because the confidentiality right
granted by the proposed tort operates only against the confidant,
the tort does not provide a cause of action if someone other than
37 9
the confidant intercepts the confidential communication.
Thus, if the press, or anyone else, gains knowledge of the confidential information from a source, the confider would not have a right
of action against them. Second, the proposed tort only protects
38
information that is transferred from confider to confidant.
There are many other ways of communicating information that the
tort would not give the confider the power to control. As one
commentator put it, the tort protects "only confidential information
from a person.., not information about him or her."38 1 Information that is communicated about a person other than orally-for
example, information acquired just from observing another personwould be difficult, if not impossible, to control. That is, because an
individual often does not know what another person thinks, sees, or
hears, she would not know to try and negotiate a commitment of
confidentiality.
Similarly, controlling information about an
individual's public behavior would also be burdensome, it being
difficult for the individual to identify and bind everyone who
witnesses the public behavior that she wishes to keep private.
Third, the requirement of an explicit agreement between the
confider and confidant will ensure that many intimates are not
bound by a duty of confidence, because the potential confider has
turn ensure that the indirect burden borne by the press is an accurate reflection of
the actual detriment imposed on the confider by the disclosure.
Finally, it should be noted that recognition of the breach of confidence tort
would not necessarily mean that editors would pay more money "up-front" for
confidential information from sources. It is possible that they would only pay the
"normal" amount for the information, but would agree to pay a portion of the
source's
litigation costs only if any litigation results from the disclosure.
378 See supra notes 349-54 and accompanying text.
379 See GURRY, supra note 34, at 14.
380 See id.
"I1Michael, supra note 206, at 1201.
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an aversion to "contractualizing" her relationships and instead relies
on trust.382 These intimates, of course, can share the information
they have gathered in the relationship with members of the press.
Fourth, because the duty of confidentiality is essentially a link
between the confider and confidant, when the confider dies this
link, and its concomitant obligation of confidentiality, is extinguished. 8 3 Therefore, eventually all bound information can be
disclosed with impunity. Lastly, the press can pay a confidant
enough money to offset her potential liability. 384 So ultimately,
information is available from any source-provided the press is
willing to pay. Taken together, these gaps in the protection
provided by the confidentiality tort would result in the press having
many different avenues for obtaining information if they want it.
Finally, it could be argued that replacing the broader privatefacts tort with the proposed breach of confidence tort would create
an incentive for the press to "snoop." If members of the press are
not concerned with protecting themselves from liability for the
publication of personal information they will not be deterred from
gathering and publishing "offensive" private facts.38 5 Though this
critique is fair, it misses the point. The Court's decision in Florida
Star v. B.J.F. has already given the press an incentive to snoop, in
that after that decision the press is no longer bound by respect for
an individual's right to privacy3 86 but only by the much narrower
consideration of whether the information is "lawfully obtained."3 87 Although the breach of confidence tort would not
substantially change the post-Florida Star orientation of the media
to news-gathering, it would provide a much needed, albeit limited,
countervailing protection of privacy interests. As Alexander Bickel
382 See supra notes 236-40 and accompanying text.
383 See BRIAN C. REID, CONFIDENTIAITY AND THE LAW

1

13.17 (1986). However,

the courts may choose to continue the duty of confidentiality even after the death of
the confider out of a concern that publication might cause harm to the confider's
survivors. See id.
3" It is true that this may limit the number of sources that the press can afford.
Still, the Court has made clear that it views the press's paying more for confidential
information not as an infringement of the freedom of the press, but as merely the
necessary cost of publicizing sensitive information. See supra notes 374-377 and
accompanying text.
8 It should be noted that if the proposed tort is adopted, the press will still be
deterred from snooping by the "lawfully obtained" doctrine and by community mores
as expressed through demand for their products.
s See supra notes 159-170 and accompanying text.
387 This doctrine is easily overcome in that the press can always "arrange" for
third-parties to purloin the information they desire.
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commented on the resulting balance when sources of information
rather than its publishers are held liable for confidential disclosures:
[T]he power to arrange security at the source, looked at in itself,
is great, and if it were nowhere countervailed it would be quite
frightening ... since the law in no wise guarantees its prudent

exercise or even effectively guards against its abuse. But there is
countervailing power. The press, by which is meant anybody, not
only the institutionalized print and electronic press, can be
prevented from publishing only in extreme and quite dire
circumstances.... It is a disorderly situation surely. But if we
ordered it we would have to sacrifice one of two contending
values-privacy or public discourse-which are ultimately irreconcil388
able.
Admittedly the balance that the "adversary game"389 among
confider, confidant/source, and press produced by the breach of
confidence tort would be an uneasy one, but it would at least be a
balance of the privacy and press interests at stake-an accomplishment which the private-facts tort cannot claim."' Recognition of
the proposed tort would, therefore, bring the clash between press
and privacy more in line with the Supreme Court's own expressed
desire to both protect privacy interests39 1 and balance the indivi3 92
dual's need for privacy with the societal need for disclosure.
CONCLUSION
In the interest of providing a more equitable balance between
the privacy and press interests involved, this Comment has advocated replacing the private-facts tort with a new tort based on breach
of confidence. The proposed tort, by targeting sources rather than
publishers of information, would effectively overcome the definitional and constitutional problems that led to the demise of the
private-facts tort. Because the proposed tort is based on the
circumscribed concept of confidentiality, rather than the more
general notion of privacy, the privacy protection that it would
provide would necessarily be limited. Still, the proposed breach of
M" BICKEL,

supra note 222, at 80. Bickel is commenting here on the situation

where the government is permitted to withhold information, not private citizens. His

point is just as applicable, however, to the latter situation.

See id.
390 See supra notes 125-31, 159-70 and accompanying text.
391 See supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
3
9 See supra note 356 and accompanying text.
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confidence tort would provide more privacy protection than exists
now, more than ever existed under the Warren-Brandeis standard,
and perhaps just as much as the First Amendment will allow. As
one commentator has remarked, "[d]espite its limitations, the
protection which the breach of confidence action does afford
against violations of one's state of privacy provides a welcome
measure of relief in a legal system which does not recognize a
general right to privacy."3 93 The irony of this statement is that
though it is a comment on English law, which has never recognized
an individual's right to privacy, it is equally applicable to U.S. law,
which has recognized this right only in theory.

39

GURRY, supra note 34, at 15.

